ORDER.-The tenant is the petitioner herein. The respondent filed R.C.O.P. No. 559 of 1971 on the file of the First Additional District Munsif (Rent Controller) Madurai, for eviction of the petitioner herein on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent. The Rent Controller found that the petitioner herein has committed wilful default in the payment of rent and on that ground, ordered eviction, giving the petitioner herein three months’ time for vacating the premises. Aggrieved by the decision of the Rent Controller, the petitioner herein presented a civil miscellaneous appeal before the Subordinate Judge of Madurai. Since there was a delay of sixteen days in preferring the said appeal against the order of eviction, the petitioner herein filed LA. No. 353 of 1973 along with the said appeal, under section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Following the principles laid down by this Court in the decision reported in J. Easwaran v. Palaniammal1, to the effect that section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority under Act XVIII of 1960, since they are not Courts, but only persona designata, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the said decision of the Subordinate Judge, the tenant has preferred this revision petition.

2. The only question that has to be decided in this civil revision petition is whether section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable for condoning the delay in preferring an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller.

3. Thiru K.J. Chandran, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein, submitted that the Rent Controller, or, in any event, the Appellate Authority is not a persona designaia, but is a Court. The learned counsel further contended that section 5 of the Limitation Act read with section 29 (2) of the said Act clearly gives the power to the Appellate Authority to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority can be construed as a Court but they are only persona designata and as such neither section 5 nor section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act will apply for condonation of the delay. Both the counsel cited a number of decisions in support of their respective contentions which I will deal with presently.

4. Sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVIII of 1960, as amended by Act XXIII of 1973, defines < Controller’ as meaning:

“any person appointed by the Government, by notification, to exercise the powers of a Controller under this Act for such area as may be specified in the notification.”

Section 23 (1) (a) of the Act states:

“The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, confer power on such officers and authorities for the purpose of this Act, in such areas and in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order” .

Section 23 (1) (b) states:

“Any person aggrieved by an order-passed by the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the fifteen days aforesaid the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.”

Dealing with more or less identifical provisions in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (II of 1965), a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court opined in J. Fernandez v. A. K. Umma2, that the Appellate Authority is a persona designata and as such neither section 5 nor section 5 read with section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act will apply for condoning, delay in filing appeals. The Full Bench observed:

“Even if the power under section 5 were to be read into special local law by reason of the provisions of section 29 of the Limitation Act, that power is exercisable only by Courts and not by Tri

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