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1974 Supreme(Mad) 196

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
N. S. Ramaswami, J.
M. Ramachandran and others. .....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Madras represented by the Collector of Coimbatore .....Respondent(s)
A.A. O.S.R. No. 62267 of 1970.
Decided On : 29 April 1974

Advocates:
S. Palaniswami, for Appellant.
Additional Government Pleader, for Respondent.

Court fee held payable.

Headnote:Madras Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1956-Sections 8 and 11-Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955-Section 51-Award-Held, Section and article applicable.

       

Order.- The question that arises is whether in this appeal under section 11 of the Madras Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Requisitioning Act), ad valorem Court-fee is payable on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant as per section 51 of the Madras Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Madras Act), or, whether only fixed Court-fee under Article 3 of Schedule II of the said Act is payable. Agricultural lands belonging to the appellant, whose appeal is yet to be numbered, have been acquired under the Requisitioning Act. Under section 8 (1) (b) of the Requisitioning Act, the District Judge, Coimbatore,came to be appointed Arbitrator to determine the compensation payable in respect of the said lands. The Arbitrator has fixed the total compensation at Rs. 1,14,324-45 but the appellant claimed a total compensation of Rs. 5,82,222-00. The value of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal shown in the memorandum of appeal is the difference between the abovesaid two sums, and that is, Rs. 4,67,897-55. But only a fixed Court-fee of Rs. 10 has been paid. No provision is quoted in the memorandum of appeal. However, it is claimed that such fixed Court-fee has been paid as per Article 3 of Schedule II of the Madras Act. The question is whether section 51 of the Madras Act which contemplates payment of ad valorem Court-fee on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant, is applicable, or whether Article 3 of Schedule II is applicable. If section 51 is applicable, then ad valorem Court-fee on the difference claimed, namely Rs. 4 lakhs odd, has to be paid in accordance with Schedule I. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that section 51 of the Madras Act is not applicable and that, therefore, only fixed Court-fee under Article 3 of the Schedule II is payable.

2. Section 51 of the Madras Act is in the same terms as section 8 of the Central Court fees Act, 1870 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act). A plain reading of section 51 of the Madras Act would undoubtedly take in the present appeal.Section 51 says that the fee for the memorandum of appeal, against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the acquisition of property for public purposes, shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. ln the present case, the Arbitrator appointed under the Requisitioning Act has given an award under section 8 of that Act and under section 9 of the said Act, there is a statutory obligation on the part of the authority authorised by the State Government to pay the said amount awarded, to the appellant herein. There can be no doubt that the award of the Arbitrator in this case is “an order relating to compensation under any Act” as contemplated under section 51 of the Madras Act.

3. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, contended that what the Arbitrator made being only an award, it is in the nature of an opinion and not an order. The learned Counsel contended that in the award there is no command or direction to the authority authorised by the State-Government to pay the compensation determined, and that therefore the award cannot be construed as an order as contemplated under section 51 of the Madras Act. This is not tenable. “ Order” does not necessarily mean that it should contain either a direction or a command. In Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon (1940 Edition) at page 918, the word “ order” is no doubt defined as a mandate or command, but it is also stated that the word “ order” would mean judgment or conclusion. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gangadhar v. N. A. M. Society1 , has held that the word “order” means a decision or a finding. Even in the Code of Civil Procedure, the word “ order” is defined only as a formal expression of any decision of a civil Court
























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