Scope of interference with discretionary orders is very limited.

(This Appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of this Court dated 2.2.2005 in Original Application No.827 of 2004 in C.S.No.791 of 2004.)

N. Kannadasan, J.

The above appeal is filed as against the order dated 2.2.2005 in Original Application No.827 of 2004 in C.S.No.791 of 2004 wherein the defendant/appellant herein is restrained from in any manner whatsoever interfering with the smooth functioning of the second plaintiff/second applicant as the trustee of the first plaintiff/first applicant and as the Correspondent of the schools coming under the trust in pursuance of the trust deed dated 24.4.1985 as amended from time to time, including running of the schools and operating the bank accounts and for consequential relief’s.

2. The suit is filed to declare the second plaintiff as validly appointed trustee of the first plaintiff trust (hereinafter called as the 'Trust') and for a consequential injunction restraining the defendant from in any manner interfering with the smooth functioning of the second plaintiff as the trustee of the first plaintiff including functioning as the Correspondent of the schools coming under the trust in pursuance of the trust deed as amended from time to time.

3. The plaintiffs have filed the application seeking the relief as stated therein by contending that the defendant by executing a supplemental deed dated 27.9.2004, whereby clauses 5 and 6 of the original trust deed dated 24.4.1985 which was later on amended on 21.8.1995 as being restored and unilaterally declared herself as a trustee and attempted to interfere with the functioning of the office of the trustee of the second plaintiff. The said application was resisted by the defendant by contending that the second plaintiff has committed serious irregularities resulting in the supplemental deed came to be executed on 27.9.2004 and she, being the author of the trust, is entitled to alter the terms of the trust and as such, the second plaintiff has no authority to hold the office any longer. The learned single Judge, by order dated 2.2.2005, has passed an order of injunction as prayed for in favour of the plaintiffs, against which the above appeal arises.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would contend that the learned single Judge has not considered the fact that the defendant has executed the supplemental deed wherein the clauses as set out in the original trust deed dated 24.4.1985 were restored and subsequent amendments to the said trust deed cannot be construed as legal, since the said amendments affected the basic structure of the original trust in respect of the line of succession to the office of the trustee. It is further contended that the appointment of second plaintiff as trustee is only by way of nomination by his father who was appointed as trustee as per the original trust deed dated 24.4.1985 and as such, there is nothing illegal on the part of the defendant to execute a supplemental deed by restoring the same clauses as set out in the original trust deed dated 24.4.1985. It is further contended that the author of the trust is entitled to exercise the powers under Section 73 of the Trust Act to restore the original position with respect to appointment of trustees and as such, the power under which the second plaintiff came to be appointed as trustee by virtue of subsequent amendment to the original trust deed was rightly taken away and hence, the nomination of the second plaintiff consequent to the subsequent amendment has to be declared as invalid.

5. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs would contend that the learned Judge has correctly held that by virtue of a supplemental deed dated 27.9.2004, the second plaintiff cannot be removed as a Trustee and at any rate, the said amendment would be only prospective in nature and it cannot interfere with the office of the second plaintiff who was appointed consequent to the relevant clauses which was introduced by way o