2004 Supreme(Mad) 106
High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. B. SUBHASHAN REDDY & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. SARDAR ZACKRIA HUSSAIN
The Government of Tamil Nadu - Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Others - Respondents
W.P. Nos.1238 to 1240 of 2004 and W.P.M.P. Nos.1297 to 1299 of 2004
Decided On : 04 February 2004
The Review Committee's decision regarding the existence of a prima facie case under POTA does not amount to interference in the judicial process and is valid.
Headnote:
POTA - 2004 - Constitutionality of sub-Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Section 60 of Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2003 - Sections 19, 40, 46, 60 - The court discussed the constitutionality of the provisions of POTA-2004, the role of Review Committee, and its jurisdiction to review the correctness of prosecution, sanction, and investigation under POTA. The court held that the Review Committee's decision regarding the existence of a prima facie case under POTA does not amount to interference in the judicial process and is valid. The court also clarified the applicability of the impugned statutory provisions to the pending proceedings and rejected the argument of encroachment of judicial powers of the State by the Review Committee.
Fact of the Case:
The constitutionality of sub-Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Section 60 of Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2003 (POTA-2004) was questioned. The Review Committee's jurisdiction to review the correctness of prosecution, sanction, and investigation under POTA was challenged by the State Government. The Review Committee had issued show-cause notices to the State of Tamil Nadu regarding cases instituted under POTA against several individuals.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Review Committee's decision regarding the existence of a prima facie case under POTA does not amount to interference in the judicial process and is valid. The court also clarified the applicability of the impugned statutory provisions to the pending proceedings and rejected the argument of encroachment of judicial powers of the State by the Review Committee.
Issues: The issues before the court included the constitutionality of the provisions of POTA-2004, the role of Review Committee, and its jurisdiction to review the correctness of prosecution, sanction, and investigation under POTA.
Ratio Decidendi: The Review Committee's decision regarding the existence of a prima facie case under POTA does not amount to interference in the judicial process and is valid. The court also clarified the applicability of the impugned statutory provisions to the pending proceedings and rejected the argument of encroachment of judicial powers of the State by the Review Committee.
Final Decision: The Writ Petitions were disposed of, and the court held that the Review Committee's decision regarding the existence of a prima facie case under POTA does not amount to interference in the judicial process and is valid. The court also clarified the applicability of the impugned statutory provisions to the pending proceedings and rejected the argument of encroachment of judicial powers of the State by the Review Committee.
The Honourable Chief Justice.
In Writ Petition No.1238 of 2004, the constitutionality of sub-Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Section 60 of Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Central Act 4 of 2004) is questioned. The above Act is hereinafter referred to as "POTA - 2004". The same was preceded by the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003, promulgated on 27.10.2003. The said Ordinance was replaced by POTA - 2004. In the Ordinance, sub-Section (7) was not there, but, was added when the Bill was presented, which transformed into Act on the assent of the President on 2.1.2004. POTA-2004 is given retrospective effect from 27.10.2003 i.e. the date of issuance of the Ordinance.
2. POTA was first enacted in the year 2002, which was also preceded by an Ordinance. POTA was enacted to contain terrorism and the incidental acts thereto and, in fact, has been modelled on the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, hereinafter referred to as "TADA". As the tenure was fixed for such enactments starting from 1984, the Central Government thought it necessary to enact laws from time to time to contain terrorism, which is on the rise every time and which has now assumed alarming proportions. The constitutionality of TADA was first challenged and the leading case on the subject is KARTAR SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (1994) 3 SCC 569). Excepting Section 22 of the Act, all the provisions of TADA were upheld. Judgment was rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. While upholding the validity of TADA, except Section 22 thereof, the Supreme Court in the above case held in paragraph 265 as hereunder:
"In order to ensure higher level of scrutiny and applicability of TADA Act, there must be a screening Committee or a Review Committee constituted by the Central Government consisting of the Home Secretary, Law Secretary and other secretaries concerned of the various Departments to review all the TADA cases instituted by the Central Government as well as to have a quarterly administrative review, reviewing the States' action in the application of the TADA provisions in the respective States, and the incidental questions arising in relation thereto. Similarly, there must be a Screening or Review Committee at the State level constituted by the respective States consisting of the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Law Secretary, Director General of Police (Law and Order) and other officials as the respective Government may think it fit, to review the action of the enforcing authorities under the Act and screen the cases registered under the provisions of the Act and decide the further course of action in every matter and so on".
3. In compliance with the same, the Screening Committees or Review Committees, by whatever name called, have been constituted to review the cases lodged under TADA to examine the existence of element of terrorism attracting the said Special Act containing harsh measures. Once the Committee takes a view that it was not a case under TADA, then the option was to deal with the same in ordinary Criminal law, if the facts and circumstances so warrant. The above Supreme Court judgment speaks of high-level officers of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. But, in the later judgment, in SHAHEEN WELFARE ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA (1996) 2 SCC 616), the Supreme Court opined that a more independent and objective scrutiny of TADA cases by a Committee headed by a retired Judge is obviously necessary. Presumably, the Central Government has taken into consideration all these statements of law made by the Supreme Court, as, while enacting POTA-2002, it had incorporated provisions in Section 60, which read:
"(1) The Central Government and each State Government, shall whenever necessary, constitute one or more Review Committees for the purposes of this Act.
(2) Every such Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and such other members not exceeding three and possessing su