The importance of fulfilling contractual obligations.

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

This writ appeal is preferred against the interim order dated October 5, 2004 passed by the learned single judge in the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein. By the impugned order, the learned single judge has modified the order of interim stay and directed the listing of the writ petition for final hearing. Aggrieved, the second respondent in the writ petition has preferred this appeal. With the consent of both parties, the writ petition is directed to be tagged along with the appeal for final hearing and disposal.

Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. It appears that the first respondent Union has filed the writ petition against the appellant, alleging violation of the provisions of Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the I. D. Act') while altering the service conditions of its members. It is well-settled principle that when the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under that Act. In the present case, the grievance of the first respondent is that the provisions of Section 9-A of the I.D. Act were breached by the appellant. If that is so, the first respondent's remedy is by approaching the appropriate forum created under the I.D. Act, viz., Board or Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Though there is a plethora of case laws on this point, we would rely only on two decisions of the Supreme Court.

In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, 1995 SC 936 the Supreme Court held as under at p. 741 of LLJ :

"32. .... (2) Where, however, the dispute involved recognition, observance or renforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the fora created by the said Act ......."

The above principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. v. U. P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh 2004 SC 179 in the following words at p. 12 of LLJ :

"5. We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition of the respondent Union at all. The dispute was an industrial dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as U.P. I.D. Act, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the respondent Union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial Disputes Act ......."

After referring to the observations made in Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay 1975 SC 367 the Supreme Court observed as follows 2004 SC 179 at p. 13:

"6. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner."

Learned counsel for the first respondent heavily relied on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Voltas Volkart Employees Union v. Voltas Limited, 1999 MAD 332. We have carefully perused the said judgment. It is to be noticed that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in U. P. State Bridge Corporation case (supra), Rajasthan State Transport Corporation case (supra) and Premier Automobiles Limited case (supra), was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench, in our opinion, is not good law.

Learned counsel for the first respondent then referred to the decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 SC 13, and very heavily relied on the observations made in paragraph 10 thereof, which we quote below :

"Under Article 226 of the Constitution,