SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2003 Supreme(Mad) 68

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.D. DINAKARAN
K.Pandurangan - Appellant
Versus
M/s.Abdul Shukoor & Co & Another - Respondents
Criminal Appeal Nos.1553 to 1564 of 1995
Decided On : 22 January 2003

Advocates Appeared:For the Petitioner:Mr.V. Vibishanan Advocate, For the Respondents: R1 Mr. Murali Kumaran, R2 No appearence.

In lieu of punishment of conviction fine paid by managing partner is sufficient punishment for all.

Headnote:Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952-Sections 2(e) and 14-A-Firm, Managing Partner and Manager charged for the offence-Only managing partner convicted by trial court-Others were acquitted-Appeal-Appellate Court convicted firm and manager also-Held, payment of fine by managing partner is sufficient punishment for the firm as well as manager.

Judgment :-

1.1. The appeals are directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 12.3.2002 made in C.C.Nos.58 to 69 of 1999 respectively on the file of the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Vaniyambadi, Vellore District, acquitting the respondents herein, who were arraigned as A1 and A3 respectively.

2.1. The prosecution was initiated at the instance of the appellant herein, alleging that the first respondent firm (A1), the Managing Partner of the first respondent firm (A2) and the Manager of the first respondent firm (A3) avoided payment to be made on behalf of the first respondent firm towards the employees provident fund contribution, as contemplated under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and the Schemes framed thereunder, after getting previous sanction as contemplated under Section 14AC of the Act. Accordingly, they were charged for the offence punishable under Section 14(1A) and 14A in C.C.Nos.58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67 and 68 of 1999, under Section 14(1B) in C.C.No.60 of 1999 and under Section 14(1B) and 14A in C.C.Nos.63, 66 and 69 of 1999.

2.2. In all the cases, independent charges were framed against the respondents herein, viz. A1 and A3 as well as the Managing Partner of the first respondent firm, viz. A2.

2.3. During the trial, it was conceded on behalf of the accused that there was a default in the payment of contribution towards the Provident Fund to be made by the first respondent firm, as charged against them.

2.4. The learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Vaniyambadi, by judgments dated 12.3.2002, holding that the first respondent partnership firm is not a legal person or a separate entity in the eye of law and the third respondent was only a manager, acquitted the first respondent firm (A1) and the Manager of the first respondent firm (A3) under Section 248(1), Cr.P.C. and convicted the Managing Partner of the first respondent partnership firm (A2) for the respective offence punishable under Section 14(1A), 14(1B) and 14A of the Act, as the case may be and sentenced till the rising of the Court and imposed a fine of Rs.1,500/-, in default, to undergo nine months rigorous imprisonment.

3.1. Admittedly, the Managing Partner of the first respondent partnership firm (A2), has not preferred any appeal against the conviction and sentence imposed on him by judgments dated 12.3.2002 in C.C.Nos.58 to 69 of 1999.

3.2. But, aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, acquitting the first respondent partnership firm (A1) and the Manager of the first respondent partnership firm (A3), the complainant has preferred the above appeals, assailing the findings of the learned District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Vaniyambadi, that the first respondent partnership firm is not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 14(1A), 14(1B) and 14A of the Act, as referred to above.

4.1. According to Mr.V. Vibishanan, learned counsel for the appellant, the first respondent partnership firm (A1), is also guilty of the offence punishable under Section 14(1A), 14(1B) and 14A of the Act, as referred to above.

4.2. Mr.V. Vibishanan also contends that the second respondent (A3), who happened to be the Manager of the first respondent partnership firm, is also guilty of the offence punishable under Section 14(1A), 14(1B) and 14A of the Act, as referred to above, or otherwise, the partnership firm cannot be proceeded against with for the offence punishable under Section 14(1A) and 14(1B) of the Act, as referred to above.

5.1. In answer to the above contentions raised, Mr. Murali Kumaran, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent partnership firm (A1) submits that when the proviso to Section 14A of the Act refers to the knowledge of the commission of offence and the due diligence to be exercised to prevent the commission of such offence, the first respondent partnership firm (A1) cannot be held guilty of the offence, as both the terms "k

































Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top