An investigation can be effected by custom authorities even after redemption of licence is completed.

These writ petitions were heard on merit on the consent of the counsels appearing for the parties at the stage of consideration of the stay petition. Common prayer in al the writ petitions is for quashing the notice issued by the second respondent dated 7.2.2002 under Section 108 of the Customs Act.

2. The facts giving rise to the W.P.No.4695 of 2003 are as follows:-

The Union Government has formulated Export Import Policy under Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, hereinafter referred to as “Foreign Trade Act”. Under the Export Import Policy, concessions were given for import as well as export. One such concession relates to import of raw materials in advance without payment of duty with an obligation to export. Under Export Import Policy, the licensing authority, namely the first respondent is the authority vested with the power of montioring and to enforce the conditions of the licence under Sections 8,9 and 11 of the Foreign Trade Act. It is the assertion of the petitioner that even though the second respondent has no jurisdiction in the matter, he is continuously harassing the petitioner by issuing notice for personal appearance. It has been asserted that the action of the second respondent in issuing notice under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is illegal and without jurisdiction. It has been further stated that Section 108 of the Customs Act can be invoked in connection with smuggling of any goods and in the absence of any smuggling of goods, violation or contravention in the matter relating to export or import can be dealt with by the first respondent and not by the second respondent. On these grounds, the notice issued by the second respondent has to be quashed.

3. The allegations in the connected writ petitions are similar.

4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the second respondent refuting the contentions raised by the petitioner.

5. I have heard Sri.V.T. Gopalan, Senior Advocate for the petitioner in W.P.No.4695 of 2003 and Sri.K.M. Vijayan, Senior Advocate in the connected matters and Sri.K.Veeraraghavan, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents.

6. Learned counsels appearing for various petitioners have contended that since the notice issued by the second respondent is without jurisdiction and without authority of law, the petitioner in various writ petitions have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even at the threshold. For the aforesaid purpose, Sri.V.T. Gopalan has placed reliance upon the decision reported in 1985(2) SCC 412 (CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF AND OTHERS v. MAJOR DHARAM PAL KUKRETY) and AIR 1999 SC 22 (WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, MUMBAI AND OTHERS).

7. Law is well settled that when action is sought to be taken by any authority without any jurisdiction, there is no embargo on the High Court to deal with the matter even at the stage of notice.

8. In A.I.R 1999 SC 22 (cited supra), it was observed :

“ 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a Writ Petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or whether there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point put to cut down this circle of forensic Whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”

9. In 1985(2) SCC 412