The principle of acquiescence applies when a party's actions or inactions lead to the acceptance of a situation, and it can impact the outcome of legal proceedings.

Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of Certiorari Mandamus, calling for the records relating to the impugned order dated 31.07.2001 made in O.A.No.3523 of 2000 on the file of Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai, the 2nd respondent, and quash the same.

P.K. Misra, J.

Heard Mr. E. Sampath Kumar, the learned Government Advocate for the petitioner and Mr.K.Raja, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent.

2. Even though the matter was listed for considering the question of vacating the stay order, since the very same question is involved in the writ petition, the writ petition is taken up for disposal on merits by consent of both counsel appearing for the parties.

3. In order to appreciate the question raised in this writ petition, it is necessary to notice in detail some of the preceding facts.

4. The first respondent in the writ petition was involved in a case of corruption and in connection with the said case, he was arrested on 08.08.1998 and remanded to custody on 09.08.1998 and he was in custody till 21.08.1998. In view of the provisions containing in Rule 1 7(e)(i)(ii) and (2) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, he was placed under suspension with effect from the date on which he was arrested. Such order was challenged by the first respondent before the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.3523 of 2000 and it was allowed by the Tribunal, after hearing both sides, on 31.07.2001, which is as follows:

“2. The main O.A.is to challenge the order of suspension dated 14.8.1998. An interim stay was granted by this Tribunal on 12.6.2000 against the order suspending the petitioner retrospectively from 9.8.1998. The petitioner has already served from 9.8.1998 to 14.8.1998. By the impugned order dated 14.8.1998 the services already rendered by him cannot be treated as a period of suspension.

3. For the foregoing reasons, the O.A.is allowed and the impugned order dated 14.8.1998 is set aside. However, liberty is given to the respondent to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. Consequently, the M.A.No.7274 of 2000 is dismissed”.

5. Prima facie it appears that the order of the Tribunal was incorrect inasmuch as the first respondent had not served from 09.08.1998 to 14.08.1998 as he was in custody by then. The erroneous order of the Tribunal was not at all challenged by the Government for a considerable length of time, i.e. four years. Thereafter, the first respondent filed W.P.No.24502 of 2004, which was allowed by an order dated 0 6.10.2004, after hearing both sides, and it reads as follows:

“2. Mr. S. Venkatesh, learned Special Government Pleader after taking notice for respondents submitted that the Government is contemplating to prefer appeal questioning the order of the Tribunal passed in O. A.No.3523/2000 dated 31.07.2001. However, he would submit that as on today, the order of the Tribunal is in force.

3. In view of the above, the respondents are directed to implement the order of the Tribunal made in O.A.No.3523/2000 dated 31.07.2001 within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order, if the order of the Tribunal is not yet challenged by the Government or any order of stay is obtained and further if there is no legal impediment in implementing the same. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, W.P.M.P.Nop.29775./2004 is closed”.

6. After such order was passed by the learned single Judge, the same was not challenged in appeal and the order was implemented by reinstating the first respondent in service on 27.06.2005.

7. Even though the Government had filed the writ petition on 19.07.2 004, it never bothered to pursue the matter and it was never brought to the notice of the learned single Judge that already one writ petition had been filed. The fact remains that pursuant to the order passed by the learned single Judge, the first respondent herein had already been reinstated by way