Court has power to extend time.

(Revision against the order dated 27.02.2004 made in I.A.No.435 of 2003 in I.A.No.180 of 2002 in O.S.No.16 of 1999 on the file of District Munsif Court, Chengam.)

M.Karpagavinayagam, J.

The question posed before this Bench, as referred to by Justice P.Sathasivam, the learned single Judge, is as follows:

"After dismissal of the earlier petition for non-compliance of the conditional order within the time stipulated, whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for extension of time, filed under Section 148 read with Section 151 CPC?"

2. The short facts are as follows:

"(i) Murugan and others, respondents herein, are the plaintiffs. They filed a suit in O.S.No.16 of 1999, for partition and separate possession.

(ii) Gowri Ammal, petitioner herein, is the second defendant, and she purchased the suit property from one Dhanapal Gounder, first defendant, who is the father of respondents 1 to 3 and husband of fourth respondent, in the year 1989, through a registered sale deed.

(iii) On 20.09.1999, the suit was decreed ex parte as against the second defendant, petitioner herein. She came to know about the ex parte decree only when a notice was served on her in the final decree proceedings on 27.01.2002. Thereafter, she filed an application, namely, I.A.No.180 of 2002, seeking to condone the delay of 1009 days in filing a petition to set aside the ex parte decree.

(iv) After hearing the parties, the delay was condoned by the trial Court, imposing a condition on the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.500/- to the respondents on or before 18.03.2003. The said amount was not paid in time. Therefore, the petition to condone the delay was dismissed on 18.03.2003.

(v) On 05.08.2003, the petitioner filed an application vide I.A.No.435 of 2003 under Sections 148 and 151 CPC, to extend the time for payment of costs.

(vi) By an order dated 27.02.2004, the said I.A.was dismissed by the trial Court, on the ground that the Court had no power under Section 148 CPC to extend the time granted earlier, as it had become functus officio.

(vii) As against the said order of dismissal, the petitioner has filed this Civil Revision Petition."

3. When the matter came up before the learned single Judge, on behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that the Court had ample power to extend the time under Section 148 read with 151 CPC, even after expiry of the period fixed, in the light of the rulings rendered by Justice V.Kanagaraj, as he then was, in Pakkiammal v. Anaiappan [2000 (3) CTC 228] and Arthanari v. S.Seshagiri Rao [2001 (3) M.L.J.808].

4. On the other hand, on behalf of respondents, three other decisions, namely, (i) D.Raju v. N.Ramalingam [2001 (3) L.W.254], rendered by Justice N.V.Balasubramanian, as he then was; (ii) Angammal v. Ramasamy [2003 (3) M.L.J.770] and (iii) K.Rangasamy Gounder v. Muthusamy Gounder [2005 (3) M.L.J.331], rendered by Justice R.Banumathi, were cited, wherein it was held by the respective Judges that the Court had no power to extend the time under Section 148 CPC, since the Court was not in seisin of the matter and it became functus officio.

5. However, the learned single Judge, who referred the matter to this Division Bench, found that subsequent to the judgments rendered by Justice N.V.Balasubramanian and Justice R.Banumathi, the Supreme Court, in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India [2005 (6) SUPREME COURT CAES 344], rendered the judgment, reiterating the principles laid down by it earlier in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das [AIR 1961 SUPREME COURT 882], that though maximum time of thirty days was prescribed in Section 148 of the Code, considering the object of the Code, namely, to promote justice, the Court can invoke both Sections 148 and 151 CPC, to condone the delay, if the circumstances so warrant.

6. On the basis of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, the learned single Judge thought it fit to refer the matter to the Division Bench, to have an elaborate consideration, with reference to the said