The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of impleading all trustees and the power to appoint trustees vested with the authorities under the Act, along with the joint capacity of co-trustees and the right conferred on the Board of Trustees when a vacancy occurs.

(Revision Petition filed against the order dated 6.4.2004, passed in I.A.No.813/1999 in O.S.No.163/1994, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Ponneri.)

This revision petition has been filed against the order dated 6.4.2004 passed by the District Munsif Court, Ponneri in I.A.No.813/1999 in O.S.No.163/1994.

2. The plaintiff temple represented by its four trustees in O.S.No.163/94 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Ponneri along with the 6th petitioner/proposed plaintiff in I.A.No.813/99 are the revision petitioners.

3. O.S.No.l63/94 was filed by Arulmigu Prasanna Vinayagar Temple, Minjur, represented by its four trustees for permanent injunction against the defendants. Pending the suit 1st trustee Mr. P.N. Munusamy Chettiar died on 5.11.1997. It is stated by the proposed 6th plaintiff in his affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.813/99 that he was appointed as a trustee for the plaintiff-temple in the place of the deceased P.N. Munusamy Chettiar by the other trustees. Hence he filed the petition to implead himself as the 6th plaintiff in the suit. I.A.No.813/99 was seriously opposed by the defendants in the suit by contending that the proposed 6th plaintiff cannot be impleaded as a party to the suit proceedings in the place of P.N. Munusamy Chettiar and the other trustees have no right to appoint him as a trustee. The trial Judge by an order dated 6.4.2004 dismissed the I.A.No.813/99 and aggrieved by the same, the above Revision Petition has been filed.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent. I have also perused the documents filed and the judgments referred to in support of their submissions.

5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioners submitted that the trial court ought to have allowed the Application as substitution of a new trustee in the place of the deceased trustee will not cause any prejudice to the defendants in the suit. She further submitted that the suit was filed by the Trust Board which is a joint and corporate and therefore it must be represented by all the trustees.

6. She relied on the following judgments in support of her contentions:-

(1) AIR 1969 Mad. 108 (Tirumalaisami v. Villagers of Kadambur

(2) 1998-III M.L.J. 28 (Mooka Velar v. The Commissioner, H.R. and C.E. Department)

(3) 2000(2) Supreme 195 (D.Srinivasan v. The Commissioner & Ors.)

7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure a party can be impleaded only when his presence is necessary and proper for an effective adjudication of the dispute involved in the suit. He further submitted that when the temple is maintained by Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments department, the power to appoint the trustees is vested with the authorities under the Act and hence the proposed 6th plaintiff could not have been appointed as trustee by the other trustees and therefore there is no illegality or infirmity in the order of the trial court warranting interference by this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

8. The plaint filed in O.S.No.163/1994 shows that the plaintiff is a temple represented by its four trustees and it is not stated in the plaint that the suit is filed by the Trust Board as contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners. Moreover already two trustees are representing the temple in the suit and in such circumstances one more trustee to represent the temple is not a necessary party.

9. In AIR 1969 Mad. 108 (supra), it is stated as under:-

"8. As regards the plea of non-joinder of other trustees, no doubt where a religious institution has plurality of trustees the institution cannot be represented unless all the trustees are made parties. If the temples are to be bound by this judgment, all the trustees are necessary parties. But the present suit is framed as against the first defendant restraining him from in any way objecting to the payment of rent by the sec