The Order of the Court was as follows :

Admittedly, the petitioner was declared as insolvent on November 5, 1990 and therefore, his service was terminated by order dated July 15, 1991 by the respondent-bank, invoking Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Thereafter, by order dated August 3, 1992, the order of insolvency was set aside by this Court, on the basis of which the petitioner, by his representation dated August 14, 1992, requested the respondent bank to reinstate him in service. However, the request was rejected by the respondent bank by their proceedings dated September 11, 1992. Hence, the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in Ref. No. ZO/IR dated September 11, 1992 on the file of the second respondent, to quash the same and to direct the respondent to reinstate him into service with all benefits of which he is entitled under the terms of his employment.

The learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to the case of one S. Subbaraya Davey, who was terminated from service with effect from September 27, 1982, as he was declared insolvent by an order dated September 27, 1982, was reinstated by the proceedings of the second respondent dated August 10, 1983, taking note of an order of this Court dated April 5, 1983, wherein the order of insolvency dated September 27, 1982 was set aside, contends that the petitioner is also similarly placed and therefore, he is also entitled to be reinstated in service by the respondent bank.

In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decisions in Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984-I-LLJ-161 and British India Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, wherein the Apex Court held that persons similarly placed should be given the benefit of reinstatement.That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that once the order of insolvency dated November 5, 1990 was set aside by an order dated August 3, 1992, it cannot be said that the petitioner was adjudicated as insolvent and therefore, the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement in service.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent bank, placing reliance on the ratio laid down in Digambar v. Central Bank of India, 1992 (II) MLJ 87 contends that the termination of service of the petitioner on account of the loss of confidence because of his act of insolvency and due to suspension of payment is valid in law and no exception could be taken from such decision in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act.

The learned counsel for the respondent bank distinguished the case of S. Subbaraya Davey on the ground that S. Subbaraya Davey was declared insolvent by an ex parte order dated September 27, 1982 and therefore, he filed an application to set aside the same as he was not heard before he was declared as insolvent. Before the disposal of the application to set aside the ex parte order dated September 27, 1982, it appears that he had settled the dues payable to the creditors, as a result of which, the application to set aside the ex parte order dated September 27, 1982 was allowed and ultimately, the insolvency petition itself was dismissed.

In any event, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner has, admittedly, suspended the payment payable to the creditor and therefore, there is a bar for the bank to continue the employment of the petitioner any further, in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act.

I have given careful consideration to the submissions of both sides.

In BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, "adjudication" is defined as follows :

"Adjudication : The legal process of resolving a dispute. The formal giving or pronouncing a judgment or decree in a Court proceeding : also the judgment or decision given. The entry of a decree by a Court in respect to the parties in a case. It implies a hearing by a Court, after notice, of legal evidence on the factual issue(s) involved."

As held in Deep