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1998 Supreme(Mad) 993

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C. SHIVAPPA & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K. NATARAJAN
G. V. Films Limited - Appellant
Versus
Unit Trust of India - Respondents
OSA No. 153 of 1997; CMP Nos. 6776, 6777 of 1997 and 807 of 1998
Decided On : 28 July 1998

Appearing Advocates:K. Mani, K. Rajasekaran, P. S. Raman, Advocates.

Judgment :-

SIVAPPA, J.

The appellant herein has questioned the order dated 25th March, 1997 on Transfer Application No. 1140 of 1997 in CS No. 253 of 1993. The appellant was arrayed as defendant No. 1 in the suit. The respondent No. 1 has filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 51, 75, 155 together with interest at 24 per cent per annum. the case of respondent No. 1 is that the dividend had been paid to the appellant wrongly though the same was due to respondent No. 2 herein. The suit was transferred under section 31 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('the Act'), to the tribunal established under the Act the section provides for transfer of all pending cases from High Courts to the concerned tribunals. Only those cases are required to be transferred from the courts where the amount of debt due to be recovered is Rs. 10 lakh or more. All other cases involving amounts of less than Rs. 10 lakh would continue to be heard and decided by the respective courts where the suits for recovery are pending. Sub-section (1) of section 31, inter alia, states "shall stand transferred on that date to such tribunal". The transfer of pending cases is an automatic process, an event which takes place on the date when the tribunal having the jurisdiction is established. No application or any request for transfer of cases is envisaged by the Act. Once the tribunal is established in a particular region then ipso facto the cases pending in the courts within the jurisdiction of that tribunal are presumed to be transferred to the said tribunal. As the tribunals are being established on differs dates in various regions of the country, the date for transfer of pending cases will mean the date of the respective tribunal. Sub-section (2) provides that the concerned courts have to transfer the records relating to the suits/proceedings to the tribunal. This is required to be done as soon as possible after the establishment of the tribunal and consequent transfer of pendings suits/proceedings. Once the records are received by the tribunal, then it is for the tribunal to decide whether it can continue to hear the matter from the stage when it was transferred to it or from any earlier date or even start the same de novo. The decision of the tribunal will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, this provision is restricted only to pending cases as explained above but does not include any pending appeals. In other words, according to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 31, all the pending appeals will continue to be heard and decided by the respective courts where the appeals have been pending.The appellant/defendant No. 1 after receipt of the notice from the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Chennai, moved an application questioning the jurisdiction of the tribunal, inter alia, contending that from the very definition 'debt', a transaction of the nature covered in the present suit is not covered under the said definition. If the cause of action relating to the present suit had arisen after the establishment of the Tribunal, the suit would still have to be filed only before this court since the transaction does not relate to debt under the Act and hence, transfer of the suit to the Debt Recovery Tribunal is not justified and proper.

The learned Judge by the impugned order rejected the application keeping in view the object of the enactment and held that it is a liability on respondent No. 1 and the plaintiff has mistakenly paid the dividend to him inter alia, the plaintiff is entitled to collect the same and pay it to defendant No. 2.

The appellant herein has challenged the order contending that the definition of 'debt' under the Act would include any liability which is alleged as due and such liability should be subsisting and legally recoverable on the date of application. Since these two conditions which are the essential ingredients of the definition have been ignored, a mistaken payment insofar as





























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