21 months time given to tenant for vacating the premises.

1.Tenant in R.C.O.P.No.6 of 1993 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Dindugal is the Revision Petitioner. This revision petition is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India.

2. Respondent herein filed an eviction petition on the ground that the petitioner/tenant defaulted in payment of rent. In the counter statement, this allegation is denied. But when the matter came up for trial, parties settled the matter and on compromise, orders have been passed. Tenant was given 21 months time to vacate the premises and in case he fails to surrender vacant possession, landlord is allowed to take possession through Court. When the tenant did not surrender vacant possession by the end of the term, landlord filed an execution petition in E.P.197 of 1998 for getting possession of the building. An objection was filed in the lower court and the tenant wanted further six months time to surrender possession. Lower Court did not allow it and ordered delivery of the property. The same is challenged in this revision petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India.

3. One of the main grounds submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner is that the compromise itself is not valid. It has not been signed by the parties but only by their Counsel, and therefore it violates Order 23, Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure. It is also submitted that there is no grounds made out for eviction and unless Rent Controller enters satisfaction on the ground of eviction, eviction should not be ordered. It is contended that the compromise decree is of nullity.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1976, a compromise will have to be signed both by the parties and their counsel and if it is not so signed, it is invalid. Learned counsel stressed that compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties, so incorporated by virtue of 1976 Amendment to Code of Civil Procedure shows that the authority of the Counsel without signature of the parties, compromise could not be entered.

5. Relevant portion of the Rule on which emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner read thus,

"Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by parties) or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (sofar as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit)." (Italics supplied)

6. In Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India,1992 (1) S.C.C. 31 the interpretation as now putforward by the learned Counsel came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court and their Lordships repelled the contention. In paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus,

"38. Considering the traditionally recognised role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents, Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise.

"39. To insist upon the