SRINIVASAN J.

These two revision petitions are against the orders passed by the District Munsiff, Udumalaipet, in I. A. Nos. 266 and 267 of 1995 granting ad interim injunction at the time of ordering notice on January 31, 1995. In I. A. No. 266 of 1995, the injunction was for restraining the respondents from taking any steps to delete article 16 of the articles of association of the first respondent company in violation of the rights of the plaintiffs under the said articles. In I. A. No. 267 of 1995, the injunction was for restraining respondents Nos. 2 to 6 from transferring the shares held by them in the first respondent company to any persons without offering them in the first instance to the plaintiffs and for restraining the company from registering or giving any effect to the transfer of such shares. In both the applications, the orders passed are in the following terms :

"Heard and perused. Issue notice with copy of documents. Ad interim injunction granted till February 9, 1995." *

Order XXXIX, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contains a specific provision that after it is proposed by the court to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. The court is also enjoined to do certain other things. It is not necessary to mention them here. Referring to the said provision of the Code, I held in Rajapalayam Industrial and Commercial Syndicate Ltd. v. K. A. Vairaprakasam, that if an order of injunction is made without recording the reasons, the injunction would be in violation of the procedure under Order XXXIX, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and I had deprecated the practice of granting such orders of injunction. The said principle is also laid down by the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das. Referring to an earlier judgment in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi the Supreme Court extracted the following passage from the said judgment (p. 337 of 81 Comp Cas) :

"...the court 'shall record the reasons' why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and the court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But the same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to rule 3 of Order 39. Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect ; as such a condition has been imposed that the court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of rule 3 will be a su