SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1994 Supreme(Mad) 186

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SRINIVASAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ABDUL HADI
Managing Director, Thanthal Periyar Transport Corporation, Villupuram - Appellant
Versus
K. C. Karthiyayini - Respondents
C.M.P. Nos. 1605, 1769 and 1771 of 1994
Decided On : 16 February 1994

Appearing Advocates:G. Muniratnamy, Advocates.

Order 41, Rule 3A(3), CPC is applicable to appeals filed in the High Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - APPEAL - STAY OF EXECUTION - ORDER 41, RULE 3A(3), C.P.C. - APPLICABILITY - APPEALS UNDER SECTION 110-D OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1939 OR SECTION 173 OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 - WHETHER ORDER 41, RULE 3A(3), C.P.C. IS APPLICABLE.

Fact of the Case:

The issue before the court was whether Order 41, Rule 3A(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is applicable to appeals filed in the High Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that Order 41, Rule 3A(3), CPC is applicable to appeals filed in the High Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues: Whether Order 41, Rule 3A(3), CPC is applicable to appeals filed in the High Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on several Supreme Court and High Court decisions to hold that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. The court also noted that Order 41, Rule 3A(3), CPC was inserted by the Amending Act, 1976 in order to prescribe the procedure for securing the final determination of the question as to limitation even at the stage of admission of the appeal. The rule does not prescribe the period of limitation for an appeal.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the civil miscellaneous petitions seeking stay of execution of the awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals.

Judgment :-

ABDUL HADI, J.

In all these civil Miscellaneous Petitions one common question of law is involved and hence they are disposed of together. These civil miscellaneous petitions are for stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in three different Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in three different motor Accidents Claims original petitions, pending disposal of three different civil miscellaneous petitions for excusing the delay in filing the respective civil miscellaneous appeal against the awards passed in the respective motor accidents claims original petition. The question is whether these stay petitions are maintainable in the teeth of Order 41, Rule 3A (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in other words, whether Order 41, Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to such civil miscellaneous appeals filed in this Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

2. Order 41, Rule 3A(3) reads as follows:-

"When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal , within such period."

" Order 41, Rule 3A(3) runs as follows:-

"Where an application has been made under sub-rule (1), the court shall not make an order for the stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the Court does not, after hearing under Rule 11, decide to hear the appeal."

Thus, where in an appeal arising out of a regular suit, there is delay in filing the said appeal and an application is filed for excusing the said delay; the abovesaid sub-rule (3) of Order 41, Rule 3A, C. P. C. precludes the court from granting an interim stay of execution of decree, until the Court, after hearing under Rule 11, of Order 41, C.P.C. admits the appeal for being heard. Therefore, in short, the question to be decided is, whether the same rule would apply when an appeal is filed against the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act.

3. Respective learned counsel in the above civil miscellaneous petitions made the following submission:- The provisions of Order 41, Rule 3A, C.P.C. will not apply to the abovesaid appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act. The decisions in Gouse Bi v. Salima Bi, (1974) 87 Mad LW 171: 1974 AIR(Mad) 220) (DB); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. S. Vasantha 1987 ACJ 887): Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Katanreddi Subbareddy 1975 ACJ 95 : 1974 AIR(SC) 310); R. Govinda Rajulu Naidu v. S. Dharman, 1986 ACJ 178: Nirmala Chaudhafy v. Bishershar Lai 1979 AIR(Delhi) 26) and State of Assam v. Gobinda Chandra Paul 1991 AIR(Gauhati) 104) were relied on by them.

4. We have considered the abovesaid submission. We may first of all state the relevant provisions under which such appeals are filed under the Motor Vehicles Act against the awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 110 D is the relevant provision, which runs as follows:-

"Appeals: (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees. "

The corresponding section in the Motor Vehicles, Act, 1988 is Section 173. There is no difference between the two provisions except the following:-

(1) Under Sec. 173 of the new Act, ther

























Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top