Meaning of the expression "Third Party".

NAINAR SUNDARAM, J.

The Insurance Company which was the second respondent before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Vellore, in M.A.C.T.O.P. No. 18 of 1980, is the appellant in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. The first respondent herein was the claimant before the Tribunal. The second respondent was the owner of the vehicle, namely, a stage carriage bus which was involved in the accident. The second respondent dies pending this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and his legal representative have been brought on record. The claimant was inside the bus at the time of the accident. He was not a passenger, being carried in the bus for hire or reward at the time of the accident. It has been found that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver. The bus had undergone repair works at the time of the accident was on the road for test driving in order to find out whether the defects had been properly rectified. In the accident, the claimant sustained injuries, and, in particular, he lost vision in his left eye and he laid a claim for compensation of Rs.1, 00, 000/-. The Tribunal awarded only a total compensation of Rs. 29, 600/-. The claimant-first respondent in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has preferred a Memorandum of Cross-objections covering enhanced compensation.

2. Mr. N. Rosi Naidu, learned Counsel appearing for the Insurance Company-appellant herein, made submissions to have his client exonerated from liability. First, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, appellant herein, would contend that the terms of the policy related only to the user of the vehicle as a stage carriage and the accident having occurred when the vehicle was not being used as a stage carriage, the liability cannot be pinned down on his client. The condition in the policy marked in this case as Ex. B-1 and relied on by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company-appellant reads as follows :

"Use only under a stage carriage permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939." *

This condition certainly does not convey the meaning that the accident should have occurred only at the time of the user of the vehicle as a stage carriage, namely, while the vehicle was plying on a route as a stage carriage. It could not only connote and denote that the vehicle must be one covered under a stage carriage permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and nothing more. Hence, we eschew this contention of the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company-appellant herein.

3. Secondly, learned Counsel would submit that the claimant would not come within the category of 'third party' so as to be covered by the policy. According to learned Counsel for the Insurance-Company-appellant herein, the expression 'third party' could only mean a person outside the vehicle and on the road and as such the policy would not cover the claimant. The terms of the policy, as such do not support such a theory. Nothing is stated in the policy to the above effect. But, learned Counsel would rely on a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., 1977 AIR(SC) 1735, 1977 (2) SCC 745, 1977 (3) SCR 372, 1977 ACJ 343, 1992 AIR(Kant) 3, 1977 AC(J) 643, 1977 (2) SCJ 442 : 1977 AIR(SC) 1735, 1977 (2) SCC 745, 1977 (3) SCR 372, 1977 ACJ 343, 1992 AIR(Kant) 3, 1977 AC(J) 643, 1977 (2) SCJ 442 ), in support of the theory advanced by him. The Supreme Court has dealt with the case of a car which was driven rashly and negligently and as a result of which the accident occurred, causing the death of a person who was travelling in the car. There was advertence to Sec. 95(1)(b), Proviso (ii) of the Act, to hold that it is not required that the policy of insurance should cover such a risk. That is the position evident from a reading of the said proviso. The operative or the latter portion of the proviso, as such, stated that a policy shall not be