The court upheld the reinstatement of the employee but denied back-wages, finding the punishment imposed by the employer to be disproportionate to the misconduct.

NAINAR SUNDARAM, J.

This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 5313 of 1979. That writ petition, in its turn, was directed against the award of the second-respondent in I.D. No. 224 of 1978. In that industrial dispute, there was an adjudication by the second-respondent, on the question of the propriety of the non-employment of the first-respondent by the appellant. The first-respondent's services with the appellant were terminated in disciplinary action. The second-respondent upheld the propriety of the disciplinary action on merits. However, on the question of punishment, the second-respondent chose to interfere and directed reinstatement of the first respondent by the appellant, denying the first respondent back-wages from 17 August 1976, when he was suspended pending disciplinary action till the date of reinstatement. This award of the second-respondent had been examined by the learned single Judge and the learned single Judge found no warrant to interfere with the discretion exercised by the second-respondent on the question of punishment and dismissed the writ petition. That is how the writ appeal has come to be preferred by the appellant.

2. Mr. M. R. Narayanaswamy, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that when the nature of the charge is considered, the punishment of dismissal from service could not be said to be harsh an keeping in mind the need to maintain discipline in the establishment, that punishment ought to have been sustained both by the second-respondent and by the learned single Judge. The charge, that was levelled against the first respondent was that he slapped the charge-hand, while on duty, on 13th August, 1976. The finding of the second-respondent, as confirmed by the learned single Judge, is that, this did happen and the domestic enquiry was not in any manner vitiated and it must be held. On 11th August 1976, the first-respondent, during night-shift was found sleeping by the charge hand. The appellant issued a memorandum to the first-respondent on 13th August, 1976, calling for explanation. On 16th August, 1976, the first-respondent wrote a letter to the appellant that on 11th August, 1976 while he was working in the night-shift he had taken ill on account of dysentery. The charge-hand complained to the appellant that on 13th August, 1976, the first-respondent slapped him stating that the charge hand was responsible for the issuance of the memorandum by the appellant. On 17th August, 1976, the charge memorandum with regard to the misconduct of slapping of the charge hand by the first-respondent was issued by the appellant. On the same day, the first-respondent replied and he denied the incident and the first respondent was also speaking about the strained relationship between him and the charge-hand. We have traced the above facts only to show as to how the incident of slapping, as found against the first-respondent, happened.3. The well accepted principle on the question of exercise of powers under Section11-A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to evaluate the gravity of misconduct for the purpose of the punishment to be imposed on a workman is, that once that power has been exercised, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any important legal principle, should not undertake to re-examine the question of adequacy or inadequacy of the materials for interference by Labour Courts. The second-respondent adverted to the case of the appellant that the first-respondent was in the habit of flouting the instructions of his superiors. In paragraph 9 of the award, the second respondent points out that there is dearth of material as to the actual order passed on such allegation. Rightly the second-respondent eschewed the suggestion on the part of the appellant to maintain the extreme penalty of dismissal from services on the ground that the past conduct of the first-responde