A court is bound to decide prima facie on the materials available, whether the plaintiff or the defendant is in possession. An order directing 'status quo' without specifying the party in possession is vague and unworkable.

The appellant herein instituted the suit, O.S. 130 of 1988 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry, for a declaration that he is the absolute owner in possession of the suit property and the lodging business run therein, for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the property, and the business and for a mandatory injunction directing the second defendant Municipality to issue a licence to run the business in the said premises. The first defendant is the mother of the plaintiff and the second defendant is the Pondicherry Municipality. According to the plaintiff, he sent moneys from Saudi Arabia where he was employed to his mother with instructions to purchase land and construct the building in the suit property and that the business was started on his instructions as he desired to give up his foreign assignment and settle down in India. He alleged that after his arrival to India and taking charge of the affairs, his mother began to make claims of ownership and interfere with his possession and enjoyment. He applied in I.A. 1369 of 1988 for interim injunction pending suit.

2. The Principal Subordinate Judge by order dated 2-5-1988, ordered notice to the defendants and granted interim injunction till 13-6-1988. The first defendant filed an application on 10-5-1988 for vacating the interim injunction. In the affidavit filed in support of the same, she claimed ownership of the entire property and asserted that she was in possession and enjoyment thereof along with her husband. She alleged that the plaintiff had unlawfuly locked one shop room and a passage in the ground floor taking advantage of the interim injunction. As the Principal Subordinate Judge's court was closed for summer holidays, the application was filed in the vacation Civil Court and numbered as I.A. 11 of 1988.

3. The plaintiff filed a long counter statement in I.A. 11 of 1988 contesting the claim made by the first defendant. On 25-5-1988, the Vacation Civil Judge passed the following order in I.A. 11 of 1988

"Counter filed by A-1 with documents Mr. T. Murugesan filed vakalat for R-2. Heard, Title deed filed by plaintiff. Licence produced. Hence, the ex parte injunction is vacated and status quo is ordered." *

Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

4. At the outset, it has to be pointed out that the fair order does not contain a list of exhibits though reference is made by the judgment to the documents filed before him. At the request of counsel, I called for the records and on receipt of records, it is seen that the appellant had filed several documents in the I.A. in support of his case. The records sent to this court do not contain any document of the first defendant. According to her learned counsel, as many as eight documents were filed in court along with a list of documents. The order refers to the production of the licence but even that document does not seem to have been marked. This unsatisfactory state of affairs is entirely due to the failure of the Vacation Civil Court to follow the rules. Rule 84 of the Civil Rules of Practice which is mandatory in its terms enjoins the Subordinate Courts to annex to the judgment a list of exhibits filed and witnesses examined. But it is seen that Courts in Pondicherry do not observe this rule. The practical utility of the rule has not been realised by these courts. The failure to adhere to the rule causes undue hardship to the parties to the proceedings when the matter is before an appellate forum. The present case is a glaring illustration of the same. When the first respondent asserts before me that eight documents were filed in the court below on her side and produces a copy of the list of exhibits, there is no indication in the court records in support of the same. But, the express reference in the order to the production of the licence shows that the assertion made by learned counsel for the first respond