Passing of decree does not make the notification in effective.

M. N. CHANDURKAR (C J)

The appellant-petitioner, whose land is being acquired by the issue of a declaration under S.6, Land Acquisition Act, is challenging the declaration under S.6(1), Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on grounds which we shall presently state. However, in order to appreciate the contentions raised before us and originally raised in the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it is necessary to refer to certain facts on which the appellant claims a relief of quashing the declaration under S.6 of the Act dt. 3-12-1983. The land in question was taken on lease by respondent 1 which is a Public Transport Corporation for a period of five years from 1-4-1974. In pursuance of certain arrangements, which according to the appellant, were arrived at between the landowner and the Corporation, the Corporation was to pay an additional rent of Rs. 750 per month, a sum of Rs. 4500 by way of advance and was to execute a lease for ten years from 1-4-1976 to 31-3-1986. The appellant's case is that accordingly the Corporation put up certain structures, but the Corporation did not abide by the agreement and declined to execute the lease. A notice was, therefore, given by the appellant calling upon respondent I to execute the agreement of lease.

2. The appellant's case is that after this notice was served, the State Government, respondent 2, came out with a notification under S.4(1) of the Act, on 9-3-1977. After the notification was published, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement under which respondent 1 was obliged to execute a lease for a period of the ten years. This was in O. S. 62 of 1977 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin. After the suit was filed a declaration under S.6 of the Act also came to be issued on 8-2-1978. The main contesting defendants in the suit were the Corporation and the State Government. Notwithstanding the fact that the only relief prayed for in the suit was a decree for specific performance against the the appellant by an interlocutory application also asked for an injunction against the State Government restraining the State Government and the Corporation from continuing the land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the suit property by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kovilpatti. This injunction was granted by the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, as prayed for. However, the Subordinate Judge made it clear that no prejudice will be caused to the respondents therein by the granting of injunction staying further proceedings in the acquisition proceedings till the disposal of the suit. Clearly, the order was an interlocutory order.

3. Only the Corporation filed an appeal in this court challenging the order of injunction. That appeal was admitted, but when a prayer for stay of that injunction was made, the learned Judge, however, declined to stay the order of injunction and directed that the injunction will continue to be in force, during the pendency of the appeal which was C. M. A.334 of 1978.

4. The suit was tried by the learned Subordinate Judge and by a judgement dt. 25-4-1979, a decree for specific performance was passed only against the Corporation. In so far as the State Government was concerned, the learned Judge positively took the view that there was no cause of action against the State Government and no relief was asked for against the State Government and

"as the controversy in the suit can be adjudicated even without the presence of defendant 1, defendant 1 is not a necessary party to the suit." *

He, therefore, found,' that defendant 1 is an unnecessary party to the suit.' It is obvious that the State Government having been found as not a necessary party in the suit, nothing said in the decree for specific performance will bind the State Government.

5. After this decree, the Corporation complied with the decree and executed the agreement of lease on 20-8-1980. It appears that the appeal aga