SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1973 Supreme(Mad) 56

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAHARAJAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATARAMAN
In Re : Ganesan, Accused - Appellant
Versus
. - Respondent
Case No : Criminal Appeal No. 351 of 1972
Decided On : 05 February 1973

Advocates Appeared:S. Narayanaswamy, Amicus Curiae, Advocates.

Grave and sudden provocation, as an exception to the offense of murder under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, can be constituted by words and gestures, and the mental background created by the previous acts of the victim may be taken into consideration in determining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation.

Headnote:

CRIMINAL LAW - MURDER - EXCEPTION I TO SECTION 300, INDIAN PENAL CODE - GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION - FACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION - CONVICTION ALTERED FROM MURDER TO CULPABLE HOMICIDE NOT AMOUNTING TO MURDER.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant, Ganesan, was convicted of murdering his wife, Kamala, by inflicting several cuts on her with a bill-hook. The prosecution alleged that the motive for the murder was the appellant's suspicion that Kamala had been having an affair with her elder sister's husband, P.W. 6, and her refusal to have conjugal relations with him. The appellant claimed that Kamala had thrown a vegetable cutter at him, causing an injury to his finger, and that this constituted grave and sudden provocation.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the appellant had indeed inflicted the cuts on Kamala that caused her death, but that he had done so under the influence of grave and sudden provocation. The court held that Kamala's act of throwing the vegetable cutter at the appellant, coupled with her previous conduct of refusing him conjugal relations and allegedly having an affair with P.W. 6, constituted grave and sudden provocation that deprived the appellant of his self-control.

Issues: 1. Whether the appellant's act of inflicting cuts on his wife was justified under Exception I to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides an exception to the offense of murder when the act is committed under the influence of grave and sudden provocation. 2. Whether the appellant's conviction for murder should be altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the following legal principles in reaching its decision: 1. The test of grave and sudden provocation is whether a reasonable person, belonging to the same class of society as the accused and placed in the same situation, would be so provoked as to lose their self-control. 2. Words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation. 3. The mental background created by the previous acts of the victim may be taken into consideration in determining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation. 4. The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from the provocation and not after the passion has cooled down, giving room for premeditation and calculation.

Final Decision: The court altered the appellant's conviction from murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

Judgment :-

VENKATARAMAN, J.

This is an appeal against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge of North Arcot convicting the appellant. Ganesan, of the murder of his wife and sentencing him to imprisonment for life. It is alleged that he cut her with a bill-hook (M.O. 1) in his house at Thiruvannamalai, about 8.30 a.m. on 8-1-1972.

2. They had been married just a few months before. But their marital relationship had not been happy. The appellant had a suspicion, which seems to us to be well founded, that she had been in sexual intimacy with her elder sister's husband, P.W. 6, and further, she had been refusing conjugal felicity to her husband, the appellant, P.W. 1, the eight year old daughter of an other elder sister of the deceased Kamala, was staying temporarily with the appellant and the deceased. On the day in question the appellant asked P.W. 1, to go and get onions. The deceased pointed out that she might be involved in some accident and declined to send her. This alone according to the prosecution, was the motive for the appellant taking the bill-hook nearby and inflicting several cuts on his wife. The murder was witnessed not merely by P.W. 1 but also by P.W. 2, who resides in the house just north. She came out on hearing the screams of Kamala and she saw the appellant inflicting some of the cuts. P.W. 4, a neighbour of the appellant, also saw the appellant coming running with blood on his hands. The appellant had a rope. The appellant ran our crying. "I have committed murder". The rope fell from his hand.

3. The evidence shows that the appellant went straight to the police station at 9.15 a.m. and made a statement. In fact, that is the first information report in the case. It contains the confession that the appellant inflicted cuts on his wife. The learned Sessions Judge has excluded this portion and marked the rest of the statement, as Ex. P. 6. This however, is not correct. In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar it has been observed :-

"Now a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime, but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a confession, each of them being part of a confessional statement, partakes of the character of a confession. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that admission but also every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the statement is part of the confession" *

............... (Para 13)

...... Little substance and content would be left in Sections 24, 25 and 26, if proof of admissions of incriminating facts in a confessional statement is permitted.

............... (Para 14)

"Some of the decided cases took the view that if a part of the report is properly severable from the strict confessional part, then the severable part, could be tendered in evidence. We think that the separability test is misleading, and the entire confessional statement is hit by Section 25, and save and except as provided by Section 27, and save and except the formal part identifying the accused as the maker of the report, no part of it could be tendered in evidence" *

The above decision has been followed in Khatri Hemraj Amulkah v. State of Gujarat, According to these decisions, the only portion of the statement which could be admitted is the initial portion that he was making the statement, which would not be of any use to the prosecution. But there is no bar to the appellant using the stateme










Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top