Ananthanarayanan, C.J.

The appellant, V. Ramiah, was employed as a cashier in the State Bank of India, Madras. After a prolonged enquiry, upon charges framed, the local board of the bank, by proceedings dated 23 February, 1962, intimated to the appellant that they were terminating his services under rule 14 of the State Bank of India (Sub-Accountants and Head Cashiers) Service Rules, after tendering him two months' salary, in lieu of notice, as provided for in Cl. 1 of the Service Agreement. The appellant instituted Writ Petition No. 528 of 1962, before Veeraswami, J., for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing this order upon the grounds shown. In a judgment, in which the respective contentions of parties have been elaborately dealt with, the learned Judge held that no case has been made out for interference with this order under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appellant has appealed from this judgment.

The arguments presented before us by the learned Advocate-General for the appellant, and the learned counsel for the respondent-bank (Sri V. K. Thiruvenkatachari) do involve certain questions of considerable interest, and some significance. They impinge upon the amplitude of our power under Art. 226, in interfering with orders of this kind, which ex facie are orders terminating an employment under a power derived from contract, by a statutory body, which, indisputably, has certain functions affecting the public, and also may be said to possess a quasi-governmental character. Another of the vital questions is, whether such a body acts as a tribunal in this kind of situation, and is bound to exercise its power as a quasi-judicial act, sub-servient to the norms of natural justice. A third question is, whether the order of termination, which could be termed the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding, or to be interpreted as a punishment imposed by the respondent-bank under powers of its disciplinary jurisdiction, or, as, what the order purports to be, a simple terminating under contract. It may be best, even before we proceed into the facts, which could be compressed into a relatively brief scope, for the purpose of this writ appeal, that these several questions are first formulated.Accordingly, we may first formulate the questions, which arise in this writ appeal, as hereunder :

(1) Is the State Bank of India, constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955, a "public authority" in law, and an "authority" within the meaning of Art. 226, to whom writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, etc., could issue ? In this respect is the amplitude of the power of the High Courts under Art. 226, wider than the aggregate of the prerogative writs in the United Kingdom ?

(2) Is the order of the respondent-bank; dated 23 February, 1962, terminating the employment of the appellant, an order passed purely upon the power derived from the contract between the parties ? If it is, should the appellant be strictly referred to his remedy in common law for damages for breach of contract, assuming that the termination was wrongful ? Or, is the order, however, seemingly disguised as an exercise of a power derived from contract, in substance and verity, a punishment imposed on the appellant in disciplinary jurisdiction ?

(3) If the order was in disciplinary jurisdiction, and it is conceded that the public authority (respondent-bank) was bound to act quasi-judicially, was the actual enquiry vitiated by a failure to observe the norms of natural justice ?

(4) What is the character of the State Bank of India Rules, under certain rules of which, notably rules 39 and 40, the actual enquiry was held ? Do there rules possess statutory character, or are they purely administrative ? Can an infringement of these rules, or any of them, be canvassed in writ jurisdiction ?

(5) When can it be held that a "public authority" like the State Bank of India, is bound to act quasi-judicially ? What is the resolution of the apparent conflict in the case-law, parti