Anantanarayanan, J.

The appellant seeks to institute this appeal from the judgment of Srinivasan, J.,

In Writ Petition No. 120 of 1962, under the following circumstances. The appellant was a senior clerk in the Southern Railway in 1958, when disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him on an averment that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification in a sum of Rs. 30 from one Kulasekharan, upon a promise to obtain a post for that individual in railway service. Prior to the disciplinary proceedings, a complaint had been made to the police which resulted in the prosecution of the petitioner for an alleged offence under S. 161, Indian Penal Code, read with certain provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The writ petitioner was convicted, and, ultimately, acquitted, but, on a technical ground relating to the processual law. It is sufficient here to set forth the following extract from the judgment of Somasundaram, J., who dealt with the matter :

"The result is that the accused (appellant) was undoubtedly in possession of Rs. 30 given by P.W. 2 which was certainly given for the purpose of getting a job for P.W. 2 as Khalassi." *

It was held by this Court that there was a defect in the charge which amounted to a material irregularity, and vitiated the conviction.

Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against this appellant after his acquittal and his reinstatement in service, upon the same broad ground of facts. Those disciplinary proceedings resulted in the dismissal of the appellant, and he then filed Writ Petition No. 120 of 1962 before learned Judge Srinivasan, J.

The following questions would appear in arise in this case

(1) Where there has been a criminal prosecution upon a certain a set of facts and an ultimate acquittal, is it open to the concerned departmental authorities to institute subsequent departmental proceedings in disciplinary jurisdiction and to dismiss the employee ? In other words, does an acquittal by a criminal Court, for whatever reason, operate as a virtual exemption from all other liability ensuing from administrative action ?(2) Can the departmental authorities pursue a procedure, like a disciplinary enquiry, which has relatively less safeguards and protection for the concerned employees, when it was open to them to have successfully prosecuted the employee in a criminal Court, and they ultimately failed to do so ?

(3) Can such departmental proceedings be initiated in the absence of a specific rule in the Railway Establishment Code, to the effect that, even if a criminal prosecution ends in an acquittal, it is open to the department to take departmental action ?

Upon the first two points, which are really interlinked, the learned Judge (Srinivasan, J.) referred to the dicta in Jerome de Silva v. Regional Transport Authority [(1952)] 1 MLJ 35]. There are certain pertinent observations in that Bench decision, on the broad principle, and the following remark might be extracted here :

"It would indeed be a strange predicament, when, in respect of the same offence, there should be punishment by the tribunal on the footing that he was guilty of the offence, and that he should be honourably acquitted by another tribunal of the very same offence. As, primarily, the criminal Court of the land are entrusted with enquiry into offenses, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals." *

With respect, we agree with the enunciation of the principle. But, as the learned Judge rightly emphasizes, it has no relevance at all to the present context of facts. In the present case, the acquittal was not based upon any finding that the appellant did not receive illegal gratification. On the contrary, there is a specific findings by the learned Judge (Somasundaram, J.), though it might be obiter in character, to the effect that the bribe was given to, and taken by, the appellant. The acquittal was on a t