SRINIVASAN, J.

In suo motu revision proceedings under section 34 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, the Board of Revenue called for and examined the original order of assessment made upon the petitioners and took the view that the assessing authority had failed to bring to tax the value of the packing materials which was included in the sales turnover of cotton yarn. It also thought that a certain part of the turnover of the cotton yarn had been wrongly exempted as second sales. In response to a notice issued by the Board of Revenue proposing to revise the assessment and to re-fix the turnover, the petitioners-assessees objected on the ground that as an appeal had been filed before the Tribunal the Board was not competent to take proceedings under section 34. Other objections to the assessability of the turnovers in question were also advanced. The Board held that the assessees had not filed an appeal to the Tribunal and that therefore the Board was not prevented from taking action under section 34. It also revised the turnover as proposed.

It is against these orders that the present appeal has been filed.

Mr. Chandrasekhara Sastry, for the petitioners principally rested his arguments upon the scope of section 34. He did not in view of certain decisions of this Court deal with the question on merits. He conceded that if this Court should hold that the Board had jurisdiction and was not prevented by any part of section 34 from revising the order of assessment, he could not press the appeal on the merits. We therefore proceed to consider the legal grounds advanced.

Section 34 of the Act confers power upon the Board of Revenue to call for and examine an order made by the assessing authority, to enquire into the matter and subject to the provisions of the Act to pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of section 34 states :

"The Board of Revenue shall not pass any order under sub-section (1) if -

(a) the time for appeal against that order has not expired; or

(b) the order has been made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal or of a revision in the High Court; or

(c) more than four years have expired after the passing of the order." *

According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the order of assessment was made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer on 15th October, 1957. An appeal against the order of assessment to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was disposed of on 12th November, 1959. Under section 36 of the Act, a further appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal and any person objecting to an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal, may file a further appeal to the Tribunal within 60 days from the date on which the order was served upon him. The Appellate Tribunal is competent to admit an appeal presented after the expiry of 60 days for sufficient cause being shown. The assessees in this case did not file an appeal within the period of 60 days from the date of communication of the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner. Admittedly they filed the appeal before the Tribunal beyond the period of limitation of 60 days, and filed also a petition for the condonation of the delay in filling the appeal. On the date on which the petition was posted for hearing before the Tribunal, the petitioners-assessees did not appear and their request for adjournment prayed for by a letter was refused. Both the petition for the condonation of the delay in the filling of the appeal and appeal petition itself were consequently dismissed.

It is not denied that the date of communication of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was 25th November, 1959, and the date of filing the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal was 27th June, 1961. The order of the Tribunal dismissing the petition for condonation of the delay and the appeal itself was on the 27th March, 1962. The Board commenced the proceeding under section 34 of the Act by notice dated 4th October, 1961.The questio