JAGADISAN, J.

The respondent is a firm of dealers in hides and skins at Madras. They were assessed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, No. 3 Moore Market, to their turnover for the year 1955-56 under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. The order of assessment was passed on 15th December, 1956. Their assessable turnover was determined at Rs. 11, 47, 315-14-7. They filed an appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer on 15th February, 1957. During the pendency of the appeal, Madras Act I of 1959 came into operation on 1st April, 1959. The appeal was transferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed appellate authority under the new enactment. By order of the appellate authority the assessee's turnover was reduced to Rs. 6, 22, 693-13-11. They preferred a further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal disputing a turnover of Rs. 80, 744. This turnover related to sales effected by them through Messrs Beardsell and Co. and they claimed that these sales were in the course of export and therefore not within the ambit of the Act. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has taken the view in regard to these sales that they were local sales assessable to tax. The Appellate Tribunal negatived the assessee's claim and confirmed the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

In the course of the hearing of the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal, the State Representative filed a petition to enhance the turnover of the assessee by including a turnover of Rs. 1, 47, 456-15-11 alleged to represent purchases effected within the State, of raw hides and skins till 6th September, 1955. The contention urged on behalf of the State was that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was illegal and improper in excluding this turnover. The Tribunal rejected the petition holding that the assessee had a vested right to have his appeal disposed of under the provisions of the old Act of 1939. This revision petition has been preferred by the State, and the only question that arises for determination is whether the Tribunal erred in law in not permitting the enhancement of assessment as prayed for by the State.Section 61 of Madras Act I of 1959 provides for the continuance of the proceedings commenced under the repealed Act of 1939, by displacing the old appellate and revisional tribunals and by creating new machineries to take their places. This process of substitution of the new machinery for the old necessarily involves a fiction that the newly constituted machineries were in existence on the date of the commencement or initiation of the prior proceedings by way of appeal or revision. At the same time the new Act, Act I of 1959 expressly saves previous operation of the repealed Act and any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued, or incurred under the said Act. The newly constituted Appellate Tribunals are clothed with wider and larger powers in the matter of disposal of the appeals than those of the Tribunals that functioned under the old Act. But the appellate power of these new Tribunals cannot be so exercised as to deprive vested rights which had already accrued in favour of the assessee. In this case when the Appellate Assistant Commissioner heard the appeal of the assessee, he could not have enhanced the assessment to his prejudice despite the fact that he had powers of enhancement, conferred upon him by section 31 of Madras Act I of 1959. The immunity or protection which the assessee had under the 1939 Act so as to save the assessment made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, the primary assessing authority, from being enhanced by the exercise of the appellate power by the Commercial Tax Officer, is a vested right, which cannot be interfered with or in any way impaired having regard to the specific provision of section 61(1) of the Madras Act I of 1959. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner only reduced the turnover to the benefit of the assessee, and it is clear that there was no