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2004 Supreme(Mad) 554

Madras High Court
K. GNANAPRAKASAM
Kannu Gounder - Appellant
Versus
Natesa Gounder - Respondent
Decided On : 03/30/2004

Advocates:
T. R. Rajaraman, for Petitioner; S. Rajaraman, for Respondent.

Relief of mandatory injunction necessary for effectuation of decree for possession.

Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Period of limitation for execution of decree for possession and mandatory injunction-Contention that execution petition filed after expiry of period of limitation not sustainable-Decree holder entitled for possession.

ORDER :- This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 29-8-2003 made in E.P. 186/99 in O.S. 696 of 1984 on the file of Additional District Munsif, Vellore.

2. The Revision petitioner is the defendant/judgment debtor. The respondent/plaintiff obtained a decree in O.S. 696/84 and the decree in his favour was confirmed in A.S. 81/99, Pursuant to the same, the decree-holder filed an execution petition for delivery of the suit property.

3. The revision petitioner objected the delivery of possession by filing a counter wherein he has stated that the plaintiff obtained a decree for mandatory injunction and that has got to be executed within a period of three years from the date of decree as per Article 135 to Indian Limitation Act and the decree was passed on 18-12-1991 and the second appeal was dismissed on 29-9-95. But, the Execution Petition was filed on 1-7-99 which is beyond the period of three years. Therefore, the plaintiff/decree-holder is not entitled to have delivery of possession after removing the building constructed in the suit property as the decree for mandatory injunction was not executed within a period of three years. The said contention was negatived by the Court below and Execution Petition was ordered. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant has preferred the Civil Revision Petition.

4. Heard the learned advocate for the revision petitioner and the respondent.

5. The suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is one for declaration and for possession and also for mandatory injunction and for other reliefs. Copy of the decree has been produced before this Court wherein clause (2) of the decree clearly provides for delivery of possession of the suit property. Of course, there is also a clause for mandatory injunction for the removal of the superstructure.

6. Now, the contention of the learned advocate for the revision petitioner is that having obtained a decree for mandatory injunction, he should have executed the said decree within a period of three years from the date of decree and the plaintiff has not chosen to execute the decree for mandatory injunction within a period of three years and therefore, the execution petition filed beyond the period of three years is hit by Article 135 of Limitation Act.

7. On the contrary, learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that the plaintiff has not only obtained a decree for mandatory injunction but also a decree for possession. The period for executing the decree of possession is 12 years as it would fall under the Article 136 of Limitation Act. It is further submitted that when there is prayer for delivery of possession, the word 'delivery of possession' includes delivery of possession after removal of any manner of structure in the suit property.

8. In order to support his contention, the respondent/plaintiff also relied upon the case of Duraisami Mundaliar v. Ramasami Chettiar, 1979 TLNJ 9 wherein this Court held that :

"the salutary principle which has got to be kept in mind is that where a Court directs by a decree or order that vacant possession of land should be given, and decree could be made effective by directing its own officer to remove the superstructure on it (Emphasis applied) and to deliver vacant possession of the property to the decree holder". It may not be necessary to have any specific power in that behalf, and such a power is exercised in every case in which vacant possession is ordered. The power to remove the superstruture on the land is an incidental power; necessary and ancillary to the power to deliver possession of the property."

9. In the case of B. Gangadhar v. B. G. Rajalingam, 1995 (2) MLJ (SC) 107 : (AIR 1996 SC 780) the Apex Court held as under:

"The exercise of incidental, ancillary or inherent power inconsequential to deliver possession of the property in execution of the decree. No doubt, the decree does not contain a mandatory injunction for demolition. But when the decree for possession had become final and the




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