The main legal point established in the judgment is that the agreements unambiguously vested jurisdiction in the Courts at Vadodara or Baroda, and therefore, the court revoked the leave granted to file the suit in the present court.

P. D. DINAKARAN, J. :- The appeal is directed against the order dated 29-3-2001 made in Application No. 3713 of 1998 in C.S. No. 87 of 1998 revoking the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to the plaintiff/appellant herein in Application No. 304 of 1998 on 2-2-1998 to file the suit in C. S. No. 87 of 1998.

2. For the purpose of convenience, the parties are arrayed as per their rank in the suit.

3.1 .The plaintiff/appellant herein filed C. S. No. 87 of 1998 to direct the defendants/respondents herein to pay a sum of Rs. 12,43,657.30 and for a declaration that the plaintiff has no dues payable as against the defendants, based on the Consignment-Stockist Agreement dated 1-10-1985.

3.2 .According to the plaintiff, they are entitled for the suit amount towards commission, discount, freight charges, etc., based on the Consignment Stockist Agreement dated 1-10-1985, entered into between the plaintiff and the first defendant in the suit. Even though the said Agreement was said to have been forwarded from the office of the first defendant from Vadodara, the plaintiff accepted it only at Madras. Since the office of the first defendant is located outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the plaintiff preferred the above Application No. 304 of 1998, invoking Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and obtained leave of this Court by order dated 2-2-1998 to sue the defendants in C. S. No. 87 of 1998.

4.1. The first defendant/first respondent herein, therefore, filed Application No. 3713 of 1998 to revoke the leave granted on 2-2-1998 in Application No. 304 of 1998 to file the above suit, alleging that, apart from the alleged agreement dated 1-10-1985, the plaintiff/appellant herein was appointed as a stockist by the first defendant/first respondent herein, by another agreement dated 1-4-1993, which is suppressed by the plaintiff/appellant herein. The first defendant/first respondent herein, however, denied any liability to the plaintiff/appellant herein setting out the details of the transactions between them.

4.2 .Inter alia, the first defendant/first respondent herein, referring to clause 22 of the agreement dated 1-4-1993 that any dispute between the parties to the said agreement would be subject to the jurisdiction of Baroda, Gujarat, contended that this Court has no competent jurisdiction to try the above suit.

4.3 .That apart, the first defendant/first respondent herein contended that even as per S. 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff/appellant herein shall institute a suit only in a Court within whose local limits, the first defendant/first respondent herein actually and voluntarily resides and carries on business, i.e., where its principal office is located, and hence preferred Application No. 3713 of 1998 to revoke the leave granted on 2-2-1998 in Application No. 304 of 1998.

5. However, the plaintiff/appellant herein denied the dispute and the existence of agreement dated 1-4-1993.

6. The learned single Judge, upon the above rival contentions, by order dated 29-3-2001, taking note of the fact that the xerox copy of the agreement dated 1-4-1993 contains the signature of the plaintiff/appellant herein and considering Clause 22 of the agreement dated 1-4-1993, held that there is no ambiguity in the said clause 22 of the agreement, which determines the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the dispute between the parties to the said Agreement, even though there is no phrase which confers "exclusive" or "only" jurisdiction at Baroda Court, and therefore, revoked the leave granted on 2-2-1998 in Application No. 304 of 1998. Hence, the above appeal.

7.1 Mr. T. K. Seshadri, learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant herein, placing reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Nanak Chand v. T. T. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1975 Mad 103, contended that it cannot be said that this Court lacks jurisdiction to try the case; that the leave granted by this Court by order dated 2-2-1998 in Appl