Agreement (exhibit 6A) was a contract to the contrary.

JUDGMENT :- The defendant in O.S. No. 38 of 1976 on the file of the District Munsif of Dindigul is the appellant in this second appeal. The respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit. The plaintiff laid the suit for recovery of possession and for damages from 1-8-1975. There is no dispute that the defendant was a tenant of the suit property, There is no document of lease exhibited in the case. Admittedly, the tenancy was not either for agricultural or for manufacturing purposes. Normally, in such a case, the tenancy will have to be determined by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. In the instant case, what happened is, the defendant on 10-7-1975, in the account books of the plaintiff, in unequivocal terms, agreed to vacate the suit property by 1-8-1975. He did not adhere to this promise but wanted a further extension of fifteen days' time under Ex.A-2 dated 2-8-1975. Obviously, this was not acceptable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff issued a notice on 11-8-1975, under the original of Ex.A-3, calling upon the defendant to deliver possession by 17-8-1975. The main question that arose on the contest by the defendant in the litigation was as to whether there should have been a further termination of tenancy within the meaning of S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'. It is true that the first court held that there was no termination of tenancy as contemplated under S.106 of the Act, and in this view dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of possession and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 1,585 towards arrears of rent till the end of 15-12-1975. The plaintiff appealed and the lower appellate court took the view that Ex.A-6 itself would amount to termination of tenancy, hence chose to reverse the judgment and decree of the first court, allowed the appeal and awarded damages at the rate of Rs. 75 per month to the plaintiff from 1-8-1975 with proportionate costs. Hence this second appeal.

2. At the time of the admission of this second appeal, the following substantial questions of law were mooted out for consideration :-

"1. Whether the undertaking to vacate the shop by the lessee under Ex.A-6 is a notice as contemplated under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act;

2. Whether the court below is correct in construing Ex.A-6 as a notice when the same stands waived by the subsequent notice Ex.A-3 given by the plaintiff;

3. Whether the lower appellate court erred in granting the decree for damages for use and occupation from 1-8-1975 when the plaintiff himself admitted that he has permitted the appellant to occupy the building up to 15-8-1975 as per the request of the plaintiff under Ex. A-2."

3. Mr. B.S. Gnanadesikan, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that Ex.A-6 could not satisfy the provisions of S.106 of the Act with reference to termination of tenancy and the lower appellate court erred in counting Ex.A-6 as amounting to termination of tenancy. I am not able to appreciate and accept this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant for the simple reason that under Ex.A-6, the defendant has agreed to vacate and deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiff by 1-8-1975. This would amount to a contract to the contrary as contemplated in S.106 of the Act. The relationship of landlord and tenant comes into existence on account of a contract between the parties and it is governed by the terms and conditions agreed to between the parties. The very set of expressions 'In the absence of a contract...........to the contrary' occurring in S.106 of the Act, makes it clear that primarily the contract between the parties should fix and lay down the terms with reference to the tenure of the lease and of the formalities of termination of such lease. But if the contract is silent on these questions, then the statutory presumption arises and the obligation to terminate the tenancy in acco