Section 16-A of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Land Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969, does not oust the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of suits for injunctions against interference with possession, even if the defendant raises a plea that he is a cultivating tenant.

ORDER:- This revision arises in execution of a decree for a permanent injunction. The decree was passed on a clear finding that the decree holder was in possession of the suit land and the judgment debtor was seeking to interfere with that possession. In the execution petition, the decree holder complained that the judgment debtor was seeking to interfere with that possession. In the execution petition, the decree holder complained that the judgment debtor had wilfully disobeyed the court's injunction and accordingly prayed for the judgment debtor's

detention in civil prison as the appropriate mode of execution against him. The executing Court has now dismissed his execution petition.

2. Before the executing Court, the judgment debtor had objected to execution being levied against him on the score that he was entitled to possession of the land. He stated that subsequent to the decree for injunction passed by the Court, he obtained a declaration from a Record Officer that he was a cultivating tenant of the land.

3. Mr. Umapathi, learned counsel for the judgment debtor, stressed this circumstance in his argument, although the Court below did not particularly rely on this aspect while dismissing the execution petition. Mr. Umapathi relied on section 16-A of Act 10 of 1969. (The Tamil Nadu Agricultural Land Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969). He said that the suit in this case was instituted after this section was introduced in the statute book in the year 1972. He pointed out that under this section, a civil Court's jurisdiction is barred in respect of matters over which the Act has conferred powers in the Record Officer and other authorities. Learned counsel urged that a declaration by the Record Officer naming the judgment debtor as a cultivating tenant of the suit land was sufficient to enable him to resist the execution of the decree against him.

4. Mr. Alagar, learned counsel for the decree holder, however, referred to the fact that after the decree for injunction has been passed against the judgment debtor, it was also confirmed by the appellate Court and only subsequently the judgment debtor had approached the Record Officer and obtained the declaration that he was a cultivating tenant. Mr. Alagar said that the executing Court cannot have regard for what the Record Officer did, but was bound to execute the decree for injunction, without question, when once its terms were violated.

5. As for Mr. Alagar's argument, it is no doubt fundamental that the executing Court cannot go behind the

decree. But it is also fundamental that it is open to a judgment debtor to resist execution on the ground that the

judgment against him is a nullity. The executing Court can very well decline to execute a decree if it is satisfied

that it is a nullity. When it does so, it is not to be regarded as going behind the decree, for the simple reason that

there is no decree at all to go behind. The stand of the judgment debtor in this case is that in view of section

16-A, the decree for injunction is a nullity.

6. To support the nullity argument, Mr. Umapathi for the judgment debtor, does not rely on the express provision in Section 16-A, barring Civil Courts from granting injunctions, for the kind of injunction which is expressly barred under this section is an injunction against a Record Officer and against other authorities from doing their duty under the Act. In this case, the injunction granted by the Court is not one of that type, but an injunction against the judgment debtor from interfering with the decree-holder's possession.

7. At the trial of the suit, the judgment debtor raised a plea in defence that he was a tenant entitled to be in possession. The court found that he was not. This finding was upheld in appeal concurrently by the Sub Court and by this Court. The details of the finding were that the person in possession of the land was not the judgment debtor but the decree-holder, that the judgment debtor was only a servant who had been en