The Insolvency Court has jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, to investigate claims and adjudicate upon them in a summary manner, and parties who participate in the enquiry and trial without raising objections to the maintainability of the Judge's summons are deemed to have waived such objections.

RAMAPRASADA RAO, J. (26-7-1977) :- When these two appeals were taken up, Mr. Sivaramakrishnaiah appearing for the appellant in O. S. A. No. 50 of 1973 as also Mr. Dolia in O. S. A. 75 of 1975 have raised a preliminary objection that the Judge sitting in insolvency ought not to have enquired into the Judge' s summons taken out by the Official Assignee under Section 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and given a judgment on the merits. Their contention is that this is a case in which the appellant in each of these appeals did not admit the liability as set out in the report of the Official Assignee and as claimed by him in the Judge' s summons and at all material times there was a contest by the appellants regarding their liability to the claim made by the Official Assignee. Mr. Sivaramakrishniah arguing on the preliminary objection would say that the proviso to S. 7 of the Act having been introduced with a distinct purpose has a meaning and a significance to serve. He would invite our attention to the history of Ss. 7 and 36 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and would contend that the Parliament was prompted to amend S. 36, Cls. 4 and 5 and introduce the proviso to S. 7 of the main Act only with the definite purpose and objective to avoid a summary investigation of claims by the insolvency Court without going through the process available under the common law. He would in the main rely upon the Full Bench decision of our Court and would say that the Insolvency Court not having adopted or followed the ratio in that decision the ultimate conclusions rendered by the said court cannot taken to be an enforceable judgment and, therefore, this appeal has to be allowed on that ground after upholding the preliminary objection. The Official Assignee on the other hand would say that such an objection was taken at the trial stage before the insolvency Judge and the said objection was negatived and overruled and it was only thereafter that the parties entered upon the Judge' s summons and went into a trial on the triable issues arising therein and that the parties willingly let in oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions and that in the circumstances therefore it is not still open to the appellants to raise once over the objections that the Judge' s summons is not investigable by the Insolvency Court. One other point that was also stressed before us was that it was in the discretion of the insolvency Judge after a prima facie examination of the material touching upon the Judge' s summons to decide whether he should take up the cause and investigate it and ultimately decide it or direct the Official Assignee to file an independent suit under the provisions of the common law. In the instant case the Insolvency Court having exercised such a discretion and the parties having by necessary implication surrendered to it and waived their objections after their preliminary objection was overruled cannot, in this court as an appellate court, reopen the question and canvass once again the position that the Judge' s summons is not maintainable.

2. No doubt, it is true that S. 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, as it stood without the proviso added to it in 1927, gave plenary powers to the court to decide on questions whatsoever whether of law or of fact which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognisance of the said court. There was also the ancillary powers to the insolvency Court under the said provision to decide any question if in its opinion it was necessary or expedient to do so for doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of the property in any such case. The latter portion of S. 7, therefore, reflects the discretionary power in the court to decide such matters. Expediency, necessity or obligation to render complete justice for the purpose of making equitable distribution of the insolvent' s property are all matters wh