The term 'rack-rent' in Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, means gross rent and not net rent, and the annual value at the rack-rent is determined based on the actual rent paid by the petitioners before the termination of their tenancies.

ORDER :- These civil revision petitions arise out of the judgments and decrees of the Second Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras passed on 25-8-1976 in Ejectment suits Nos. 285, 280, 284 and 286 of 1975.

2. The trial court ordered eviction of the petitioners in these civil revision petitions holding that their old tenancy had been terminated and no new tenancy has come into existence thereafter, that there is no waiver of notice of the termination of tenancy by acceptance of any rent and that G. O. No. M. S. 1998 Home Department, dated 12-8-1974, exempting properties belonging to temples from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1960 applies to the respondent-devastanams.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners canvassed before me only the question of the Jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, Madras, to entertain the ejectment suits under Sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. It may be stated at this stage that no plea of want of jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court to entertain the suits had been taken in the written pleas filed by the petitioners in the ejectment suits and that the plea of want of jurisdiction of the lower Court was taken by the petitioners in the C. R. Ps. 2102, 2123 and 2125 of 1976 for the first time only in the memorandum of grounds of the civil revision petitions. The petitioner in C. R. P. No. 2199 of 1976 had not raised the plea of want of jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the suit even in the Memorandum of grounds of civil revision petition. But he has been allowed to raise that plea by an additional ground as per order in C. M. P. No. 4657 of 1977 by this court. The result is that the plea of want of jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the suits under Section 41 of the Act has been taken for the first time only before this court in these civil revision petitions. The suits are really applications for issue of summons to show cause why the persons concerned should not be compelled to deliver up the properties.

4. The learned counsel for the respondent-devastanam contended before me that the plea of want of jurisdiction not having been taken before the lower Court should not be allowed to be raised for the first time before this court in the revision petitions. But the objection does not appear, in my opinion to be well founded. Pandrang Row J. has observed in Kuppuswamy Chetty v. Ayyammai Ammal, AIR 1935 Mad 723, that in the matter of pecuniary jurisdiction, the waiver of a party is not sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess. A Bench of the Patna High Court has gone a step further in National Coal Co. Ltd. v. L. P. Dave. AIR 1956 Pat 294. The facts of that case disclose that the petitioner before the learned Judges submitted to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal below It was therefore, urged on behalf of the opposite party that the opposite party cannot raise the question of want of jurisdiction. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Judges that the consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction to a court or tribunal if it had none. The learned Judges have observed that the proposition was undoubtedly true, when there was inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court or Tribunal. They have further observed that where the want of jurisdiction had to depend upon proof of certain facts and those facts had not been raised and proved a party cannot be permitted to raise a plea of want of jurisdiction so as to render its decision void and ineffective. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court has observed in Rajalakshmee Dassee v. Katyayani Dassee, (1911) ILR 38 Cal 639 thus -

"It is an elementary principle of law that, if a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, its judgments and orders are mere nullities, and may not only be set aside at any time by the court in which they are rendered, but be declared void by every court in which