A contract to the contrary can override the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act regarding the validity of a notice to quit.

JUDGMENT :- Defendants are the appellants. The suit was for ejectment on the allegations that the plaintiff-trust is the owner of the suit property, that the first defendant is a monthly tenant under the plaintiff, that the first defendant, according to the lease, should vacate after 30 days, notice, that no improvement had been made by the defendants as to claim compensation at the time of vacating, that to the notice issued the first defendant replied denying the tenancy, that thereupon a fresh notice dated 26-1-1968 was issued determining the tenancy and that the second defendant has been impleaded as a party as the first defendant has transferred the lease to him. The plaintiff no doubt denied the alleged transfer and also denied any practice in respect of chatram properties, alleged by the defendant.

2. The first defendant contended that he transferred the lease to the second defendant on 21-11-1967, which has been recognised by the plaintiff, that compensation has to be paid for the improvement made and that the lease is a permanent one and cannot be terminated, particularly against the wish of the creator of the trust who wanted to benefit his relations. The first defendant also contended that the notice to quit is defective and that he is an unnecessary party since the second defendant alone is the tenant, whose tenancy has not been terminated. It has also been alleged by the first defendant that the suit property is a minor inam, that the defendants are entitled to patta and that the matter should be referred to the Settlement Tahsildar. Finally, the first defendant pleaded that the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action.

3. The second defendant, in his written statement, alleged that he is the tenant, that no valid notice of termination has been given to him, and that as he got a transfer of the lease by paying Rs. 3,000 the said amount should be paid to him by the plaintiff. In other respects, the second defendant adopted the written statement filed by the first defendant.

4. The trial court, on the issues framed, held that the lease deed Ex. A-1, executed by the first defendant clearly mentions that the lease can be terminated by 30 days, notice, that the lease is not a permanent one, that Ex. B-12, the lease deed in favour of the second defendant, is a fabricated one and as such it is only the first defendant who is the lessee under the plaintiff and not the second defendant, and that Ex. A-2, the notice determining the tenancy of the first defendant giving him 30 days' notice as per the terms of the lease, is valid and enforceable in law. The trial court further held that no compensation need be paid to the defendants for the alleged improvements and there is no question of misjoinder of parties and causes of action, as pleaded by the defendants. On these findings, the trial court directed the defendants to hand over vacant possession of the suit property within a month from 23-10-1972.

5. Aggrieved by the said decision of the trial court, the defendants preferred an appeal to the Sub-Court, Chingleput. The Subordinate Judge of Chingleput, confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal, A. S. 116 of 1973. Aggrieved by the decisions of the courts below, the defendants have now preferred this second appeal.

6. The main points argued by Sri Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the appellants are-(i) that the lower appellate court has not discussed the evidence on record as the final court of facts, and as such the decision given by the lower appellate court has to be set aside; (ii) That Ex. A-2, the notice to quit, is not valid in law; (iii) and that the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action.

7. Sri T.V. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-respondent contended that the evidence is before this court and the discussion made by the trial court is also there in its judgment and as such this court can decide the matter without any difficulty, that Section 106