The Commissioner's power to appoint an executive officer under Section 45 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, is not unguided and arbitrary, and the absence of prescribed conditions or a show cause notice does not invalidate the appointment.

ORDER:- The petitioners are the three of the non-hereditary trustees out of the five appointed for the religious institution comprising the Arulmigu Margasahaya Iswarar, Varasidhi Vinayakar and Karunakara Perumal etc., group of temples at Madurayoyal, Saidapet taluk, Chingleput District, by an order dated 27-8-1973 of the Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments. It appears that apart from the three trustees who are the petitioners herein, the other two are not effectively functioning as trustees. The 4th trustee is said to be a former managing trustee and he is said to be giving constant trouble to the petitioners who are said to be sincere in carrying out their duties as trustees. The fifth trustee is said to have resigned from the trusteeship.

2. The first respondent herein, in exercise of his powers under Section 45 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, had appointed, by his order dated 4-9-1975, the 3rd respondent as the executive officer of the group of temples in question. The petitioners have challenged, in this writ petition, the validity of the said appointment.

3. According to the petitioners, the order appointing the 3rd respondent as the executive officer of the group of temples in their charge, is invalid for three reasons viz., (1) Section 45 does not give any indication as to when and in what circumstances the power of appointing an executive officer should be exercised and therefore, the power under that section cannot, validly, be exercised; it is unguided and arbitrary; (2) Section 45 enables the Commissioner to appoint an executive officer for a religious institution subject to such conditions as may be prescribed and therefore, so long as the conditions contemplated by that section have not been prescribed by the State Government, the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to exercise that power contained in that section; and (3) In any event, the Commissioner cannot, by his order, appoint the executive officer under the said section without giving any show cause notice to the existing trustees or without giving any finding that their management is defective.

4. As regards the first contention, the learned counsel points out that Section 45 cannot be taken to have conferred on the Commissioner an unguided and arbitrary power to appoint an executive officer to a religious institution, that the mere statement in the impugned order that it is for the better administration of the temples, is quite insufficient, and that the Commissioner must find that there are circumstances warranting him to appoint an executive officer, I am of the view that Section 45 cannot be taken to confer an unguided and arbitrary power on the Commissioner, that the power under the section has got to be exercised in terms of the policy of the Act i.e., to provide for the administration and governance of the religious and charitable institutions, and endowments, under the State of Tamil Nadu. If, in fact, the Commissioner exercises the power under Section 45 on extraneous or irrelevant considerations, then, the particular exercise of the power can be challenged as being outside the purview of Section 45. In this case, the first respondent has specifically stated, in the order appointing the executive officer, that the power has been exercised for the better and proper administration of the group of temples. I cannot say that this is, in any way, either irrelevant or extraneous. I cannot, therefore, hold that the impugned order passed by the first respondent is, in any way, arbitrary.

5. Regarding the second contention that since no conditions have been prescribed by the rules subject to which the power under Section 45 has to be exercised, the Commissioner cannot exercise the power, the learned counsel states that the prescribing of the conditions is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power under Section 45 (1). In support of this contention, learned counsel p