1976 Supreme(Mad) 77
Madras High Court
K. VEERASWAMI,SURYAMURTHY
U.Abdul Jabbar - Appellant
Versus
Manonmani Pictures by Partner K.R.E.Pattilinga Nataraja Gounder - Respondent
Decided On : 02/09/1976
M.R. Narayanaswami and K. Venugopal, for Appellants; R. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar and R. Desikan, for Respondents.
A person can only be regarded as a legal representative of a deceased person if they represent the estate of the deceased, are an heir of the deceased, or are sued in a representative character.
Headnote:
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES - DEFINITION - PARTNERSHIP - DISSOLUTION - ORDER 21, RULE 49 (2) OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
The first respondent obtained a money decree against the judgment-debtor, Fakir Mohamed, in O.S. No. 322 of 1963. Fakir Mohamed and his son entered into a partnership with the first appellant under the name Majeeth Mark S.P.S. Beedi Factory. Fakir Mohamed died on 18th January, 1972. His widow instituted O.S. No. 48 of 1972 for dissolution of the firm and taking its account. A consent decree was passed declaring that the partnership stood dissolved as on 18th January, 1972. The first respondent took out execution of the decree and impleaded the appellants as legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The Court below granted the prayers and appointed a Receiver under Order 21, Rule 49 (2) of the Code to sell and collect the amounts earned by Fakir Mohamed in the Partnership business and to pay the same to the decree-holder in discharge of the decree-debt.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the appellants were not the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor and that the order of the Court below under Order 21, Rule 49 (2) was defective as it applied to a dissolved firm.
Issues: Whether the appellants could be regarded as the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the appellants could not be regarded as the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor as they did not represent his estate, were not his heirs, and were not sued in a representative character. The Court also held that the order of the Court below under Order 21, Rule 49 (2) was defective as it applied to a dissolved firm.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed with costs.
VEERASWAMI, C. J. :- Respondents 4 and 5 in the Court below are the appellants. The first respondent had obtained a money decree against the first respondent in the Court below, one S.S. Fakir Mohamed, in O. S. No. 322 of 1963 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore. The decree was made on 8th October, 1964. Fakir Mohammed, the judgment-debtor, a film producer, ran into debts. He was also carrying on business as a beedi merchant. On 19th February, 1968, Fakir Mohamed and his son Habibur Rahiman, the third respondent, on the one hand, and the first appellant Abdul Jabbar on the other, entered into a partnership under the name and style of Majeeth Mark S.P.S. Beedi Factory, Coimbatore. Majeeth Mark S.P.S. Beedi Factory by partner Abdul Jabbar the first appellant, figures as the second appellant. Fakir Mohamed died on 18th January, 1972. His widow, the 2nd respondent instituted O.S. No. 48 of 1972 for dissolution of the firm and taking its account. Abdul Jabbar was a party-defendant in that suit. It ended in a consent decree which declared that the partnership stood dissolved as on 18th January, 1972, the day Fakir Mohamed died. The accounts of the firm were filed in Court which were said to have established that no amount whatever was due to the late Fakir Mohamed from out of the firm, but he was only indebted with his son to the tune of over Rs. 3 1/2 lakhs to Abdul Jabbar. The first respondent in the appeal took out execution of the decree. He impleaded Fakir Mohamed (dead) as the first respondent, his widow and his son as respondents 2 and 3, Abdul Jabbar as the 4th respondent, and Majeeth Mark S.P.S. Beedi Factory by partner Abdul Jabbar, as the 5th respondent. The petition for execution under Order 21, Rule 11 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, was to implead respondents 2 to 5 in the Court below as legal representatives of the fist respondent, Fakir Mohamed and for appointment of a Receiver under Order 21, Rule 49 (2) of the Code to sell and collect the amounts earned by Fakir Mohamed in the Partnership business and to pay the same to the decree-holder in discharge of the decree-debt. The Court below granted both the prayers. It was of the view that although Fakir Mohamed was the sole proprietor of Majeeth Mark S.P.S. Beedi, it became a Firm of Partnership as from 19th February, 1968, and that in view of the recital in the Partnership Deed, the partnership could not be dissolved by the parties unless all the liabilities mentioned in the Schedule were discharged by Abdul Jabbar. The Court below thus thought that notwithstanding the death of Fakir Mohamed and the consent decree mentioned by us, the partnership continued since Abdul Jabbar had not discharged all the debts. This was the basis for the order the Court below made under Order 21, Rule 49 (2), since according to the Court below, Abdul Jabbar was in possession of Majeeth Mark S.P.S. Beedi Factory after the death of Fakir Mohamed, he was an intermeddler with, and in possession of the beedi business as a partner. The Court said that the 4th respondent was in possession of part of the estate of the deceased. So it held Abdul Jabbar was a legal representative of the deceased Fakir Mohamed.
2. The propriety of the order of the Court below making the appellants as the legal representatives of the deceased in the execution of the decree against them, and appointment of a Receiver and other relief under Order 21, Rule 49 (2) made by the Court below, is questioned before us.
3. The contention for the appellants was that in no view of the matter can they be regarded as the legal representatives of the deceased Fakir Mohamed. We are of opinion that the appellants are right in their contention. A "legal representative" as defined by Section 2 (11) of the C. P. C. is a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased, and where a party sues or is sued in a representative cha