Article 44 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies to suits by a ward to set aside an alienation made by their guardian, and the suit must be brought within three years of the ward attaining majority.

ISMAIL, J. :- The plaintiffs In O. S. No. 60 of 1963 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge. Salem, are the appellants herein. There was one Venkatarama Iyer, to whom the suit property belonged, and he had four sons, Narasimha Iyer. Nanna Iyer, Sundara Iyer and Sitarama Iyer. He obtained releases from two of his elder sons, Narasimha Iyer and Nanna Iyer, under Ex. B-21, dated 24-7-1908 and Ex. A-15 dated 12-7-1913 respectively. Afterwards, under Ex. A-1. dated 10-11-1918, he entered into an arrangement with his third son, Sundara Iyer, and fourth son, Sitarama Iyer. The terms of the agreement, as recorded in paragraph 11 of the judgment, the correctness of which has not been challenged before us. is that Sundara Iyer should have a life estate in the suit properties without any power of alienation and he should live in the house and collect the rent and maintain himself, and the sons to be born to Sundara Iyer subsequent to Ex. A-1 have to get these properties absolutely. The plaintiffs and the first defendant in the suit are the sons of Sundara Iyer and admittedly they were born subsequent to Ex. A-1. Sundara Iyer alienated the suit properties in favour of one Piyari Jan Ammal under Ex. B-22, dated 5-3-1943. Subsequently, he re-purchased the properties from Piyaci Jan Ammal under Ex. B-23, dated 31-3-1946. Thereafter, he made the present alienations which are the subject-matter of attack in the suit. The C Schedule property was alienated by Sundara Iyer to one Ramaswami Iyer on 7-11-1946 under the original of Ex A-5. The D Schedule property was alienated in favour of defendants 3 and 4 under Ex. A-7, dated 1948. The E Schedule property was alienated in favour of one Venkatachalapathi Iyer under Ex. B-26 (the registration copy being Ex. A-6), dated 17-3-1947. All these documents were executed by Sundara Iyer not only on his own behalf but also as the guardian of his minor sons, the plaintiffs as well. In all these sale deeds, the first defendant, who was a major on the dates' of the transactions, has joined in executing them. It is after all these the present suit was instituted for a declaration that the sale deeds executed by Sundara Iyer regarding the C to E Schedule properties are not binding on the plaintiffs so far as they relate to the two-third share of the plaintiffs, for partition and separate possession of their two-third share and for past and future profits.

2. The defendants, other than the first defendant are the alienees or their legal representatives, and they have put forward several contentions, the principal of them being one of limitation.

3. The trial Court considering the evidence and the contentions of the parties, came to the conclusion that the suit instituted by the appellants was barred by limitation, though the properties were the self-acquired properties of Venkatarama Iyer, the grand-father of the plaintiffs in the suit. This conclusion had to be rendered in view of the case put forward by the alienees that the properties were the joint family properties of Venkatarama Iyer. In view of the finding on the question of limitation the suit was dismissed. Hence the present appeal by the plaintiffs in the suit.

4. Since we are of the opinion that the suit instituted by the appellants had to fail on the ground of limitation, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other controversies raised by the parties. The trial Court has applied Article 44 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act of 1908 and held that the plaintiffs having instituted the suit after the expiry of three years of attaining majority, the suit was bound to fail. There is no controversy before us that if Article 44 of Schedule I of the Act of 1908 was the proper Article applicable, the suit was barred by limitation.

5. Mr. B. V. Viswanatha Iyer, the learned Counsel for the appellants, sought to contend before us that the trial Court was wrong in applying Article 44 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act of 1908 and that it is re