An act of the Court shall prejudice no man (actus curiae nominem gravabit), and the doctrine of property being in custodia legis coupled with public policy in rendition of proper justice and conservance of power therefor would prevent the extension of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act to a tenant let into possession by a Receiver appointed by Court.

VEERASWAMI, C.J. :- This reference raises an interesting question as to whether a tenant let into possession of land and incidental immovable property by a Receiver appointed by Court pending a suit would, be entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The suit was brought by the tenant for an injunction, out of which the second appeal arises. The lease in his favour was in 1957 and it was to enure after renewal every year upto November 15, 1961. In that year, the Receiver was discharged, but the tenant continued to hold over and cultivate the land. When the true owner sought possession, the plaintiff brought the suit for a preventitive injunction from disturbance. His, ground was that he having been let into possession by the Receiver as a tenant, after expiry of the term of the lease he continued to be in possession and cultivated the land, and that as such he would be a cultivating tenant by operation of law and entitled to protection from dispossession under the Act.

2. For the appellant strong reliance was placed on Serang Abdul Khadir v. Rajagopala Pandrayar, (1956) 1 Mad LJ 34 which was concerned with a tenant under the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act. The lands in that case belonged to a Devasthanam. A Receiver was appointed by Court under O. XL, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure who granted a lease in favour of two persons for a certain period. The Devasthanam took possession of the lands on the expiry of the lease granted by the Receiver and cultivated the land itself. Respondents 1 to 8 before the Court were sub-lessees from the original lessees. For the year 1952-53, the Devasthanam, leased out the lands to the appellant there. . The question before the Court was who was entitled to the benefits of the Act. Whether it was the appellant or respondents 1 to 8. Those respondents filed an application under Section 6 (2) of the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act successfully and possession was restored to them. An appeal arising out of it failed, and, thereafter, a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution came before Rajagopalan, J. The prayer there was for a right to have the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer quashed on the ground that the respondents would not be entitled to the rights conferred by the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Act. The appellant in the appeal denied that the respondents would be entitled to any such right because of two reasons. One was that they were sub-lessees under a lease from a Receiver, and a Receiver could not be deemed to be a "land owner" within the meaning of the definition of that term in Section 2 (g) of the Act. The other reason was that respondents 1 to 8 were not "cultivating tenants" within the meaning of the term in Section 2 (g) because they were not in possession under a tenancy agreement with the land owner, to wit, the Devasthanam, and their only agreement, was with the lessees. Rajagopalan, J. overruled those objections. The same two grounds were reiterated before the then learned Chief Justice and Panchapakesa Aiyer, J., but not without success. They were of opinion that a Receiver virtually represented the real owner of the property in his possession, and that he would, therefore, be the owner for the time being of the property and would fall within the definition of "land owner" in Section 2 (g) of the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952. They referred to the definition of the words "cultivating tenant" in Section 2 (d) of the Act and to the fact that a tenancy agreement, express or implied, did not indicate that such agreement must be with the land owner as defined in Section 2 (g) as persons who contributed their own physical labour or that of the members of their family in the cultivation of land belonging to another and who were so cultivating under a tenancy agreement, that is to say, not as trespassers or as owners, would be within the definition of the term "cultivating tenant". Ramaswamy Gounder v. Kal