The decision of a statutory authority on a question whether a particular piece of land is jenmom land or not is not binding on the civil court if the statutory authority does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide such question.

JUDGMENT :- The plaintiff in O.S No. 137 of 1964 on the file of the court of Princiral District Munsif. Padhamanbapuram, who succeeded before the trial Court and lost before the first appellate Court is the appellant herein. The suit was instituted (as seen from the plaint which was finally amended) for redemption of an alleged othi under Ex. A-2 dated 8-6-1094 M. E. The principal question that had to, be considered by the courts below was whether the land in question was janmom land coming within the scope of the Travancore Jenmi and Kudivan Act of 1071 M. E. as amended in 1108 M. E. or is it a Sreepandavaraga land. The consequence of the land being jenmom land will be that the appellant was not entitled to redemption and recovery of possession while if the land was Sreepandavaraga land the appellant would be entitled to recover possession thereof on redemption. The one other question that came to be considered was whether the transaction under Ex. A-2 was an irredeemable one or redeemable one. Though the learned Principal District Munsif who disposed of the suit decreed the suit as prayed for, the learned District Judge of Kanyakumari at Nagarcoil had on appeal reversed the conclusion and dismissed the suit.

2. The points that arise for consideration are (1) whether the land in question is jenmom land as defined in Jenmi and Kudiyan Act; (2) whether the transaction under Ex. A-2 was kanom and if so it was an irredeemable one or redeemable one and (3) whether the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer under Ex. A-3 functioning under the Madras Act 39 of 1964, namely, the Madras (Transferred Territory) Jenmikaram Payment Abolition Act, 1964, holding that the land in question is not jenmom land, precluded the civil court from going into the question whether the suit land is a enmom land or not.

3. As far as the first part is concerned, I am clearly of the opinion that the contention of the appellant is absolutely untenable. It is admitted before me that Ex. A-2 refers to the land only as ienmom land. If Ex. A-2 has referred to the land as jenmom land and the parties to Ex. A-2 dealt with the property on that basis with all the legal incidents attached to it, it is certainly not open to the appellant subsequently to turn round and contend that the suit land is not jenmom land. A Bench of the Travancore High Court in Madan Padmanabha v. Krishna

Narayanaru, (1929) 19 Trav LJ 760, while considering a similar question pointed out thus :-

"If there is evidence to show that the property was at the time represented to be jenmom and the transaction entered into on that basis, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff can resile from that position and contend that the legal incidents of the Jenmom property are not claimable with respect to the mortgage holding."

After referring to the above observation of the Travancore High Court. I have held in my judgment dated 1-9-1972 in S. A. No. 1000 of 1969 (Mad.)-Ganapatia Pillai v. Karuthudayan Nadar - that when the ,parties had treated the property as jenmom property with all the legal incidents attached thereto, it was not open to them to go behind and contend that the property is not jenmom but Sreepandaravaga property. In this case, as I have already pointed out Ex A-2 described the suit property as ienmom property, though in the plaint the appellant contended that the property really was Sreepandaraga property. Having regard to the decision of the Travancore High Court referred to and my decision in S. A. 1000 of 1969 (Mad.) I hold that in view of the description of the suit property as jenmom land in E'x. A-2. it, was not open to the appellant to put forward the contention that the suit land is not a jenmom land but Sreepandavaraga land.

4. As far as the second point is concerned, admittedly Ex. A-2 provides for a renewal at the end of 12 years. The question for consideration is whether it provided for one renewal at the end of the first 12 years from the date when Ex. A-2 came into e