The vesting of building and site under Section 18(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, only occurs when the building and site both belong to the same person immediately before the date of notification.

VEERASWAMI, C. J. :-This appeal by the quondam landholder is from a judgment of Natesan, J., reported in Silambani Sri Chidambara Vinayagar Devastanam. Devakottai by its trustees v. Duraiswami Nadar and another, 1967-2 Mad LJ 181. The suit out of which the appeal arises was Instituted by Silambani Sri Chidambara Vinayagar Devastanam, Devakottai, by its trustees to recover rent from the first respondent in respect of a site let out to him for building purposes. The tenancy commenced prior to 1948. The site is situate in a village which constituted as estate. That was notified and taken over under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948. On that date, the building continued in the first respondent's occupation. There is no dispute that on the notified date Devastanam was the landholder. The defence was that under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948, the suit site along with the building had vested in the first respondent, and the title of the appellant as a landholder got extinguished. There appears to have been a question of jurisdiction raised, but it is no longer before us. The first appellate Court , held that the Devastanam had lost its right on the notification made under the provisions of the Act. It is also held that the first respondent was not estopped from disputing the title of the Devastanam. Natesan, J. dismissed the second appeal, he being of the view that immediately on the notification, the appellant, the quondam landholder, had lost his interest in the site, which is vested in the Government. The learned Judge, therefore, considered that the appellant was not entitled to claim any rent for the site from the first respondent.

2. It is contended for the appellant that the real effect of Section 18 (4) was to vest the building in it. This is on the view that as mentioned by sub-section (5) of the section building includes the site, and, therefore, whoever owned the building became owner of the site. In our view, this contention cannot be accepted. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of S. 18 reads :-

"Every building other than a building referred to in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall, with effect on and from the notified date, vest in the person who owned it immediately before the date; but the Government shall be entitled, for each year commencing with the fasli in which the estate is notified

(i) in every case, to levy the appropriate assessment thereon; and

(ii) in the case of a building which vests in a person other than a landholder also the payments which such person was liable immediately before the notified date to make to any landholder in respect thereof, whether periodically or not and whether by way of rent or otherwise, in so far as such payments may accrue due on or after the notified date.

(5) In this section 'building' includes the site on which it stands and any adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereof''.

The result of sub-section (5), to our mind, is that the definition contained therein, when incorporated in sub-section (4), would have this consequence, that, if the building as well as the site on which it stands both belong to the same person, upon the notification, both of them will vest in that person. That, we think, is the true scope of sub-sections (4) and (5) read together. These provisions do not contemplate a transfer of the ownership of the site to the owner of the building where it had not already belonged to him. Unless there is a coalescence of the ownership of the building as well as of the site on which it stands, there will be no vesting under sub-section

(4). That is the view Natesan. J., took and we agree with him.

3. But that will not conclude against the appellant. On our view of the effect of sub-ss. (4) and (5) read together it would follow that clause (ii) of sub-section (4) will have no application to the instant case, which, in our opinion, cannot be relied on by the State to collect the rent. If the State has any right to it, that is to be found from the