ANANTANARAYANAN, C. J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment just delivered by my learned brother. I entirely agree with him, not merely on the conclusion that the appeals ought to be allowed, but also on the grounds upon which that conclusion has to be based.

2. It may, hence, appear somewhat superfluous that I should write a separate judgment, however, condensed. But I am impelled to do so, for an important reason. It is possible to present the central argument that Mr. V. Thyagarajan has sought to put forward, in these appeals, as the horns of a dilemma. Presented in that form, the argument has the merit of great plausibility, at least on the first scrutiny. It is for this reason that I propose to tersely examine the links, in the logical chain of this argument, and to demonstrate that our conclusion follows as the correct one, even conceding the plausibility.

3. The process of reasoning is best expressed, I think, in the following form. Is there a suit known to law by an insurer, as in this case, who has, partially or wholly, reimbursed the assured on a contract of indemnity, or Marine Insurance, in respect of loss or injury to the goods, and who seeks to recover from the wrongdoer, to a proportionate extent, as one who is subgrogated to the rights of the party originally damnified? Certainly, such a suit is known to law, and is a well-known instance of the application of the equity doctrine of subrogation to Marine Insurance. It was originally expressed in Sections 130-A and 135-A of the Transfer of Property Act, and this concept is now embodied in Section 79 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963, which repeals those sections of the Transfer of Property Act. We must here emphasise that, though the content of the claim or action by the subrogee is identical with, and cannot be different from, the rights of the assured, to whom the insurer is subrogated, nevertheless, the insurer can claim to be subrogated, only proportionately to the extent to which he has compensated the assured for loss or damage to the goods. These principles are not in controversy.

4. Next, to follow the argument of Mr. Thyagarajan a little further, what would comprise the bundle of rights known as the cause of suit, or "cause of action" for the subrogee to recover from the wrongdoer damages to the proportionate extent? It is here that the classical definition of Lord Esher becomes significant, that the cause of action is 'every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court'. Mr. Thyagarajan argues, is it not necessary for the insurer-plaintiff to prove, in an action of that kind, that he paid compensation to the assured to the extent to which he claims relief against the wrongdoer, standing in the shoes of the assured, as he does, upon the equity principle of subrogation? The answer is certainly in the affirmative.

Mr. V. V. Raghavan for the Board of the Port Trust of Madras does not dispute, for example, that if a suit were brought forward by the insurer against the Board, without this vital link being averred and proved, that would be a fatal bar to the suit. Here Mr. Thyagarajan rightly contends that the depth of the implications of this issue was not measured in Madras Port Trust v. A. M. Safiulla and Co., (1962) 2 Mad LJ 29 at p. 32 : (AIR 1965 Mad 133 at p. 135) when Jagadisan, J., observed in that judgment :

"The fact that the subrogee gets a complete cause of action only after payment to his assignor cannot give an extended period of limitation to the subrogee by computing the period of six months from the date of subrogation. The recognition of a fresh starting point of limitation in favour of the subrogee from the date of subrogation may lead to the anomaly of reviving barred claims". The learned Judge was careful to qualify these opinions, by observing that he was not finally deciding the matter; it was left open and the observations have t