A person who has been lawfully detained cannot gain his liberty by other means excepting by due course of law. It cannot be an excuse for a person in custody to say that he has been taken away by someone and that he has not escaped from the lawful custody at the time when he was taken, after he is set at liberty by the persons who had taken him away.

ORDER :- The revision petitioner is accused 6 in S. C. No. 72 of 1966 on the file of the IIIrd Assistant Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli. He was originally charged along with several other accused under Sections 147, 148, 224, 225, I. P. Code etc. and tried by the IIIrd Assistant Sessions Judge. Accused 5 and 7 and the petitioner alone were convicted and the rest were acquitted. The petitioner was convicted under Sections 224 and 323, I. P. C. and sentenced to under R. I. for one year and three months respectively by the Assistant Sessions Judge. On appeal, accused 5 and 7 were acquitted of all the charges and the petitioner was also acquitted under Section 323, I. P. C. but his conviction and sentence under Section 224, I. P. C. were confirmed.

2. The relevant facts for the purpose of appreciating the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are these : On the 20th February 1966 at about 8 p. m. the Sub-Inspector of Police, Turiayur, while he was on his rounds with a police party, arrested one culprit on suspicion and sent him to the police station under the escort of a constable. When the rest of the police party was proceeding towards Palle street in Turiayur, they noticed the petitioner coming in the opposite direction pushing a bicycle. He was stopped on suspicion and on search, it was found that he was in possession of I. D. arrack in a bag. The Sub-Inspector of Police arrested the petitioner and was escorting him to the Police station with the help of a Head-constable and two other constables. When they were proceeding with the petitioner, on the way 40 or 50 villagers formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the object of rescuing the petitioner and pushed the head constable and the constables who were escorting the petitioner, whereupon the petitioner made good his escape and joined the crowd. The crowd began to attack the head constable and the constables with deadly weapons. Soon thereafter, the petitioner who had earlier escaped from the police custody came up with a stick and assaulted the head constable on his shoulders, with the result that the head constable fell down. The petitioner thereafter escaped. The petitioner was subsequently arrested by the police on 5-3-1966, nearly about a fortnight after his escape. On these facts, the conviction of the petitioner under Section 224, I. P. C. was confirmed by the appellate Court.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to challenge the finding of the appellate Court on merits. But, however, he contended that on the facts of this case, the conviction of the petitioner cannot be sustained as the prosecution has not established that the petitioner intentionally escaped from the lawful custody of the police officer, inasmuch as, he was forcibly rescued by the crowd and taken away. In other words, he would contend that at the time of the alleged escape from the lawful custody of the police officer, the prosecution should show that the petitioner had the intention to escape and if he was taken by the crowd by using force, even if he had not submitted to the custody of the police officer after he was released by the crowd, still he would be committing an offence under Section 224, I. P. C. as the gravamen of the offence is the intention of the person at the time of escape from the lawful custody.

4. To appreciate this contention, it will be necessary to note carefully the language of Section 224. I. P. C. which runs as follows -

"whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself for any offence with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted, or escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained for any such offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

This section deals with two distinct offences committed independently of each other. The first