ORDER : This is an application under S. 115 C.P.C. to revise the order of the learned District Judge, Coimbatore in C. R. P. 1052 of 1962. The learned District Judge allowed a revision by the landlord against the Judgement of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ootacamund in C.M.A. 2 of 1962. by which the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the order of the House Rent Controller in H. R. C. 69 of 1960 and held that there was no wilful default by the tenant justifying his eviction. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that there was wilful default and so allowed the revision. Realising the limitations of S. 115 C.P.C. Mr. A.K. Sriraman learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the learned District Judge in so far as he differed from the Subordinate Judge and held that there was wilful default in the payment of rent by the tenant was either exercising a Jurisdiction not vested in him or acted with material irregularity and therefore this Court in exercise of its powers under S. 115 C.P.C. should interfere.

2. I am afraid the arguments of the teamed counsel for the petitioner as to the ambit of S. 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are not justified by the wording of that section. He has referred me to two decisions of this Court, one of Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. in C.R.P. No. 1420 of 1954 (Mad) and another by Rajamannar, C.J. in Sasivarna Thevar v. Ponnu, 1957-1 Mad LJ 158. In the case decided by Rajamannar, C.J. be extracts with approval a paragraph from the judgement of Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. which reads thus :

"The only proper way of defining the relative jurisdiction of the appellate and revisional authorities constituted under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is to hold that while an appellate authority is entitled to examine every question of tact and law dealt with in. or arising out of, an order of the Rent Controller, a revisional authority, while undoubtedly can interfere with the question of law, where the Rent Control Act or any provision has been misconstrued, cannot normally interfere with findings of fact, unless (a) there were no other materials on which such a finding could be based; or (b) the finding has been reached by a consideration of irrelevant or inadmissible matter; or (c) It is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion; or (d) the finding had been reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter. To hold that a revisional authority could interfere with findings of fact of an appellate authority without regard to these limitations would be to convert a revision into a regular appeal and to obliterate the distinction between appeals and revisions which the Act has taken care to provide".

With great respect to the learned Judges, I cannot help feeling that both their Lordships have not considered the words of Section 12(b) of the old Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1949 or S. 25 of the present Act, which enable the District Court fan the case of mofussil cases and the High Court in cases arising in the city to consider the lower court's order with regard to its legality, propriety and regularity. There is no reference in either of the two judgements, to the exact implications of these words.

3. The implications of the word "propriety" have been considered by the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman v. Govt. of Madras AIR 1956 SC 463 : 1956-1 Mad LJ 189 (SC) thus :

"The word propriety' has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary Vol. VIII, it has been stated to mean 'fitness: appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions, conformity with requirements; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 'If the State Government was of the opinion that respondent 2 had better facilities for operation than the appellant and their services to the public would be more beneficial

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