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1966 Supreme(Mad) 134

Madras High Court
NATESAN
T.K.Ramanujam Pillai - Appellant
Versus
Alagiamannar Rajagopalaswami Deity Palayam Kottai through its trustee T.M.Subramaniam - Respondent
Decided On : 04/16/1966

Advocates:
R. Gopalaswami Iyengar, for Appellant; D. Ramaswami Iyengar, for Respondent.

A second appeal is not maintainable in a suit of a small cause nature, and the court has the discretion to convert a second appeal into a civil revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C., but such interference will only be made in the interests of justice.

Headnote:

HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS ACT, 1951 - SECTION 87 - Compromise Memo - Validity - Jurisdiction of Court - Small Cause Suit - Second Appeal - Maintainability - Conversion into Civil Revision Petition under Section 115 C.P.C. - Discretion of Court - Interests of Justice.

Fact of the Case:

A suit was filed by the general trustee of a temple against the defendants for recovery of a sum of Rs. 980, based on a joint memo filed by the defendants under Section 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The defendants had covenanted to put 70 cents of land to the best use and pay the income to the general trustee. The trial court granted a decree against both defendants, but the lower appellate court exonerated the first defendant and dismissed the appeal against the second defendant. The second defendant filed a second appeal, challenging the validity of the compromise, the authority of his counsel, and the character of the memorandum of compromise.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the suit was of a small cause nature and the second appeal was not tenable. It also declined to convert the second appeal into a civil revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C., as interference would not be in the interests of justice.

Issues: 1. Whether the suit was of a small cause nature and the second appeal was maintainable? 2. Whether the compromise memo was valid and enforceable? 3. Whether the general trustee had the power to condone the appellant's acts and claim the income as per the joint memo?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The character of the suit is determined by the allegations in the plaint, and the contentions put forward by the defendant cannot alter its nature. 2. The suit was based on the failure of the defendants to pay according to the terms of the contract, and was cognisable by a court of small causes. 3. The court declined to decide on the validity of the compromise memo or the authority of the counsel, as these issues were not necessary for the disposal of the second appeal. 4. The court also declined to interfere under Section 115 C.P.C., as the plaintiff devastanam would be out of time to take effective steps to recover any income from the defendants for the period in question.

Final Decision: The second appeal was dismissed, and the court made it clear that none of the contentions raised on behalf of the second defendant were decided in the proceedings.

JUDGMENT :- This second appeal has been preferred by the second defendant in a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 980 against the defendants, by the first respondent as the general trustee of a temple. The basis of the suit is a joint memo which the second defendant and the first defendant by his mother as guardian, the defendants acting through their counsel filed, the other party to the memorandum being the general trustee of the temple the memo being filed on an application under S. 87 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. Under the compromise memorandum, the defendants had covenanted to put 70 cents of the Nandavanam poromboke land, which they were alleged to have unlawfully converted into wet land, to the best use and pay whatever income was realised therefrom to the general trustee of the temple with the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments. The allegation in the plaint is that the defendants had failed to pay the amounts as covenanted in spite of sanction having been obtained. The suit was originally filed in the Sub-Court, Tirunelveli, as a small cause suit and later by an administrative order transferred to the District Munsif Court, Tirunelveli where it was tried as an original suit. The trial Court granted a decree against both the defendants, the principal contention of the first defendant who was a minor at the relevant time being that he was not bound by the compromise. Various defences had been raised on behalf of the second defendant questioning the validity of the compromise, the authority of his counsel to enter into compromise and the character and nature of the memorandum of compromise. It was impugned as invalid and beyond the powers of the trustees. He claimed to be the special trustee and it is contended that the compromise could not be valid in the circumstances and on its terms. The Courts below have not gone into the question of title set up by the parties to the Nandavanam poromboke land. The trial Court, as stated already, decreed the suit against both the defendants but limited the period for which the profits could be claimed.

There was an appeal and the lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal so far as the first defendant is concerned. He has been completely exonerated from liability. The appeal so far as the second defendant was concerned was dismissed. A memorandum of cross objections was filed by the plaintiff in the lower appellate Court in respect of the period for which profits had been disallowed and this was allowed by the lower appellate Court with costs.

2. In this second appeal before me, learned counsel appearing for the second defendant appellant has raised various contentions some of which do not appear to have been raised in the Courts below. The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit is questioned. It is contended that the compromise as such is not enforceable. It is argued that the plaintiff will not be entitled to claim the entire income as such. It is pointed out that the lower appellate court erred in its view that the plaintiff could get a decree for the entire period and not for a period of three years prior to the suit as decreed by the trial court. So far as this point is concerned, there can be no doubt about its maintainability because the cause of action is the failure to pay and the fact that the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner may be necessary will not extend the period of limitation as viewed by the lower court.

3. A preliminary objection was taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiff Mr. D. Ramaswami Aiyangar. It is pointed out that the suit is of a small cause nature and the second appeal is not competent. Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar contends that in the circumstances of the case, and in view of the questions that properly had to be decided in the suit the suit is not of a small cause nature. But the character of the suit has to be determined only by reference to the allegations in th



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