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1965 Supreme(Mad) 172

Madras High Court
KAILASAM
G.Gopalaswami - Appellant
Versus
G.Navalgaria - Respondent
Decided On : 04/23/1965

Advocates:
A. K. Shanmugasundaram and K. Sengottiah, for Appellant; M. P. Subramaniam and K. L. Krishnan, for Respondents.

An order of the Claims Tribunal refusing to entertain an application for compensation after the expiry of the sixty days period under Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is an award and appeal lies against such order under Section 110-D.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 110-A(3) - EXCUSING DELAY IN FILING COMPENSATION APPLICATION - SUFFICIENT CAUSE - INTERPRETATION - APPEALABILITY OF ORDER REFUSING TO EXCUSE DELAY - SECTION 110-D.

Fact of the Case:

Appellant met with an accident on 15-9-1961 and sustained a compound fracture of the right leg. He was admitted to the hospital and discharged on 11-7-1962 due to want of accommodation. He filed an application on 15-10-1962 for excusing the delay in filing the main application for compensation under Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Finding of the Court:

The Tribunal dismissed the petition on the ground that the appellant was discharged on 11-7-1962 and there was no necessity to detain him in the hospital any further. The court held that the order of the Tribunal refusing to entertain the application is an award and appeal lies against such order under Section 110-D.

Issues: 1. Whether the order of the Tribunal refusing to excuse the delay is an award and appealable under Section 110-D? 2. Whether the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The word "award" in Section 110-D includes a decision by the Claims Tribunal in dealing with an application for compensation arising out of an accident. 2. The appellant was severely injured and was confined to bed even after his discharge from the hospital. The delay in filing the main petition was due to valid reasons.

Final Decision: The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the delay in filing the main petition is excused. The Tribunal is directed to take the main petition for compensation on its file and dispose it of according to law.

JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal by the injured person in a motor accident against the order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dismissing an application for excusing the delay in filing the main application for compensation under Section 110-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant met with the accident on 15-9-1961. It is admitted that he sustained a compound fracture of the right leg. He was admitted in the hospital, and according to him he was in the hospital till 11-7-1962, when he was discharged due to want of accommodation in the hospital. It is stated that he continued to be in bed in the house of a friend of his till 15-10 1962, when he filed this application for excusing the delay in filing the claim petition under Section 110-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 110-A (3) of the Act provides that no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso to this section empowers the Claims Tribunal to entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of 60 days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The tribunal dismissed the petition mainly on the ground that he was discharged on 11-7-1962, as there was no necessity to detain him in the hospital any further, and that would indicate that the petition ought to have been filed on 11-7-1962. The Tribunal was not satisfied with the affidavit of the claimant that it was not possible for him to file the petition before 15-10-1962.

2. A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the appeal. It was submitted that under Section 110-D and appeal is provided to a person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal. It was contended that the order of the Claims Tribunal refusing to entertain the application which was filed 60 days after the date of the accident is not an award. I am unable to accept this contention, for the order of the Tribunal refusing to entertain an application puts an end to the claim and decides the application once for all against the claimant. A reading of Section 110-D does not warrant the restricted meaning that an appeal is available only against the order granting or refusing the award. The meaning of the word "award" is "to adjudge, grant.. .. judicial decision." The word award is used to include a decision by the Claims Tribunal in dealing with an application for compensation arising out of an accident. To construe the word award to include only the determination or refusal to grant any

compensation may be giving a very restricted meaning. When the Tribunal decides to entertain an application after the expiry of the sixty days or refuses to entertain an application, the decision is judicial in character, and is an award. Section 110-D provides right of appeal to any person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal, and if the order refusing to excuse the delay is an award, there can be no difficulty in holding that appeal lies against such order under S. 110-D.

3. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Surajmull Nagarmull v. State of West Bengal, 1963-2 SCR 163 : (AIR 1963 SC 393) where it was held that under Section 19 of the Defence of India Rules, an appeal is provided against an award where the amount of compensation does not exceed Rs. 5000/- in lump or Rs. 250 per mensem. The wording of the proviso to section 19 is materially different from S. 110-D. Under the Defence of India Rules an appeal is provided only against an award where the amount of compensation awarded

does not exceed Rs. 5000. On the wording of the proviso the Supreme Court held that the right to appeal does not depend upon the claim made by the claimant either before the enquiring authority or the arbitrator or before the High Court but depend solely upon the amount of compensation awarded by the arbitrator. In this case, under Section 110-D clause (2), the right of appeal



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