ORDER : The tenant has preferred this revision petition under S. 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent who is the landlord filed a petition for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the tenant was guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent for 18 months from March 1961 to September 1962, that the respondent required the premises, which is a car shed, for his own use and occupation to keep his car, which he had been garaging in a rented shed and that the tenant, having taken the premises as a car shed for garaging his car, was putting it to a different use, storing his goods for umbrella business. Both the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority held that the landlord had not made out a case for evicting the tenant on the two later grounds. They concurrently held that the property was not leased for the express purpose of being used as a garage, that the tenant had been using the premises for his business purposes only, that the landlord did not require the premises for garaging his car, as the latter had several garages of his own and that, as A matter of fact, certain garages belonging to the landlord, had become vacant and were available for his use, but yet he did not make use of any of them which had fallen vacant. On the question of wilful default, both the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority decided against the tenant and ordered eviction; this is the only question that survives for decision in the revision petition.

2. The Rent Controller found that the tenant was guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961, and ordered eviction. It may be mentioned that the rent for the month of March 1961 must have been paid by 30-4-1961, and the rent was sent on 9-5-1961, by money order and it was returned, evidently because the landlord declined to receive it, with the result the delay was less than two weeks. On appeal, the appellate authority took the view that the tenant was guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent not only for the month of March 1961, but for subsequent months also. Learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant), at the outset, contended that the appellate authority ought not to have considered the question of wilful default for the subsequent months and should have confined itself to the question of default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961. He urged that even though in the petition the landlord relied upon the default in the payment of rent for 18 months from March 1961 to September 1962, in the course of the enquiry and the arguments before the Rent Controller, the parties confined and restricted themselves to the question of wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961 alone.

In this connection, learned counsel drew my attention to the evidence adduced on both sides as well as to the discussion of the question in the order of the Rent Controller. He also contended that because the appellate authority had exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with material irregularity in embarking upon the investigation of an aspect which was really not in issue between the parties and the parties therefore did not focus their attention and adduce evidence touching that question, the petitioner has raised this objection in the forefront in the memo of revision petition filed in this court. There is considerable force in this contention, and I am satisfied that the parties confined and restricted themselves to the question of wilful default in the payment of rent for the month of March 1961 only, and that the Rent Controller, therefore, deliberately did not express any opinion regarding the alleged default in the payment of rent for the months following.

I am unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that because the point framed by the Rent Controller included the question of default for the later months also, the

Click Here to Read the rest of this document