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1964 Supreme(Mad) 81

Madras High Court
VEERASWAMI
V.C.K.Bus Service (P) Ltd., Coimbatore - Appellant
Versus
H.B.Sethna - Respondent
Decided On : 02/18/1964

Advocates:
M. Natesan for T.R. Mani and M. Panchapakesan, for Petitioners; T.H. Ramachandran, for Respondent.

A litigant does not have a vested right in a particular forum, and a change of forum does not affect vested rights.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - SECTION 110-F - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS - BARRED - CLAIMS TRIBUNAL - JURISDICTION - RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT - NO VESTED RIGHT IN FORUM - LIMITATION - NOT A VESTED RIGHT - SECTION 110-A(3) - NOT APPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING PRIOR TO TRIBUNAL'S CONSTITUTION.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners sought a rule of prohibition restraining the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal from proceeding with the enquiry into certain claims preferred by the first respondent. The accident occurred on 6-1-1961, before the constitution of the Tribunal on 12-7-1961. The petitioners contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims as they arose before its constitution and that the bar under Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on civil courts' jurisdiction was not retrospective.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, expressly barred civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain accident claims from the date of the constitution of a Claims Tribunal for any area. The change from civil court to Tribunal was a change of forum, not a matter involving a vested right in the claimant. The court further held that Sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A, which prescribed a narrower period of limitation for applications to the Tribunal, did not apply to claims arising before the constitution of the Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claims in question.

Issues: 1. Whether Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, barred civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain accident claims from the date of the constitution of a Claims Tribunal for any area? 2. Whether the change from civil court to Tribunal involved a vested right in the claimant? 3. Whether Sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A applied to claims arising before the constitution of the Tribunal?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, expressly barred civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain accident claims from the date of the constitution of a Claims Tribunal for any area. 2. The change from civil court to Tribunal was a change of forum, not a matter involving a vested right in the claimant. 3. Sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A, which prescribed a narrower period of limitation for applications to the Tribunal, did not apply to claims arising before the constitution of the Tribunal.

Final Decision: The petitions were dismissed with costs.

Judgement

ORDER :- These petitions, which ask for a rule of prohibition restraining the second respondent, the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal, Coimbatore from proceeding with the enquiry into certain claims preferred by the first respondent in each of these petitions, raise a point of jurisdiction of that Tribunal. The motor accident occurred on 6-1-1961, in which the bus belonging to the first of the petitioners and a motor car owned by the first respondent in one of these petitions were involved. The accident resulted in personal injuries to the claimants before the Tribunal Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for a constitution by the Government, by notification

in the Official Gazette, of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, for specified areas, for adjudicating upon claims for compensation, in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury to persons, arising out of the use of motor vehicles. By a notification dated 12-7-1961, the District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore, was constituted as Tribunal for such a purpose. Before then such claims were adjudicated on suits in civil courts. The procedure to be followed by applicants before the Tribunal is prescribed by S. 110-A, which includes a provision as to limitation for applications. The application should be filed before the Tribunal within 60 days of the occurrence of the accident. To Sub-Section (3) of S. 110-A, which provides for this, is attached a proviso, the effect of which is that delays may be condoned by the Tribunal if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause bom making the application in time. The effect of constitution of such a Tribunal upon the jurisdiction of civil courts is to be found in S. 110-F. That section expressly states that where a Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal for the' particular area. Apparently, in view of this bar, and the provision as to limitation and the fact that the accident here took place prior to the date of the notification constituting the tribunal, its jurisdiction to entertain the claims would appear to have been questioned by the petitioners. But the Tribunal did not accept this objection, with the result that the petitioners have moved this court for the relief I have mentioned.

2. Section 110-F, as I said, expressly takes away the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain such claims from the date a claims tribunal has been constituted for any area. But it is argued that this bar to civil court's jurisdiction will apply only to cases of accidents which occurred subsequent to the date of the constitution of the Tribunal and not to accidents happening earlier to that date. The basis for this argument is that Sub-Section (3) of Section 110-A provides for a narrower period of limitation for an application for claims than for a suit under the Limitation Act and that a claimant has therefore a vested right to ask for his remedy within the larger period of limitation. Since this vested right is affected, so is the argument, by Section 110-F it should not be read as retroactive in its effect upon civil court's jurisdiction in entertain suits involving causes of action arising anterior to the date of constitution of a Tribunal in support of this contention reliance is placed on a judgment of Jagadisan, J. in Chandrasekaran Pillai v. Narayanaswami, C. R. P. No. 1520 of 1962 dated 7-2-1963 a short note of it is reported in 76 Mad LW (SN) 44. I shall presently refer to this decision.

3. I take it as irrefutable law that no litigant has, or can have, vested right in a particular forum. He cannot say as a matter of right that his suit or application should be tried by this or that forum which existed on the date his cause of action arose. Forum belongs to the realm of procedure and does not constitute substantive












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