Non-framing of profits does not vitiate the judgment.

Srinivasan, J.

1. Three questions are raised by learned Counsel for the appellant. The appellant is a purchaser of the suit property under Ex.B.1, dated 31.7.1969 from one Parthasarathy Naicker, who in turn purchased the property from one Natesa Padayachi under Ex.B.3 dated 26.9.1958. Under Ex.B.2, Natesa Padayachi had purchased the property from one Kokilambal Ammal. The plaintiffs in the suit, who are the respondents herein are the sons of Perumal Padayachi who was the son of Govindasamy. Govindasamy had a brother Manickam whose wife was Kokilambal Ammal referred to above. Manicka Padayachi and Govindasami Padayachi had acquired properties by joint exertion and in a partition in 1940 amongst themselves they divided these properties and the suit property along with some other properties were allotted to the share of Manicka Padayachi. Manicka Padayachi died towards the end of 1940. Govindasami Padayachi filed a suit as the next friend of the first and second plaintiffs herein on the file of Sub Court, Cuddalore for a declaration that a will dated 4.7.1940 left by Manicka Padayachi was true, valid and binding on the defendants. Kokilambal Ammal was the first defendant and there were 3 other defendants with whom I am not concerned in these proceedings. While Govindasami Padayachi put forward the Will dated 4.7.1940 as the last testament and Will of (Manicka Padayachi) Manicka Padayachi's last Will was dated 27.6.1937 which was registered on 30.6.1937 and the Will put forward by Govindasami Padayachi was not genuine. In the course of the suit there was a compromise between the parties. The compromise decree is marked as Ex.A.1 in the present proceedings.

2. Under Clause II of Ex.A.1, the Will dated 27.6.1937 executed by Manicka Padayachi and registered on 30.6.1937 was declared as the last Will of Manicka Padayachi and both parties agreed that the said Will should be in force. Under Clause III, the property described in Schedule A to the compromise decree which was the sixth item in the plaint, was to be enjoyed by Kokilambal Ammal without any encumbrance for her life time and after her life to be taken by the plaintiffs and other brothers absolutely. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to any other clause though Clause 13 of the compromise decree was very much under consideration in the Courts below. In my view that has no relevance in this case.

3. Kokilambal Ammal alienated the property as referred to above under Ex.B.2. She died on 16.3.1964 and the present suit was filed on 11.4.1975 by the plaintiffs for declaration of their title to the suit property and for recovery of possession besides profits. The trial Court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs which was affirmed by the appellate Court.

4. In this second appeal three questions are raised as stated in the beginning. The first point argued by learned Counsel for the appellant is that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is vitiated for want of framing of a point for consideration by the appellate Judge. After setting out the pleadings of both the parties and the conclusion of the trial Court, the appellate Judge proceeded to discuss the merits of the case and the evidence on record. Ultimately he gave a finding that the plaintiffs had title to the property and the judgment of the trial Court had to be affirmed. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that under Order 41, to Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is the duty of the Court to frame the points for consideration and to give finings thereon with reasons to support those findings. I am of the view that in the present case the judgment is not vitiated for want of framing of such a point. Though a point has not been framed by the appellate Judge, he has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail and ultimately came to the conclusion. His findings are supported by his reasons. Hence there is substantial compliance with the provisions o