The violation of a provision of an order made under an enabling provision of another order, which was made under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, cannot be considered a contravention of the latter order and thus cannot be punished under Section 7 of the Act.

Janarthanam, J.

1. Petitioners are accused 1 to 3 in STC (EC) No. 8 of 1988 on the file of the Presiding Officer (Special Court under the Essential Commodities Act), Thanjavur.

2. Accused 1, a company going by the name M/s. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd, situate at Nellikuppam South Arcot District is manufacturing sugar and other products. During the year 1984-85 accused 2 and 3, then General Manager and acting Factory Process Superintendent, were in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of accused-1-company.

3. One B. Karunamoorthy, inspecting Officer (Sugar) of the Directorate of Sugar, Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, (Department of Food) inspected the factory premises on 18.7.1985 and collected samples of sugar certified to be truly representative samples from the stocks in the factory go downs of 1984-85 season's production, after duly complying with all formalities. Of these samples collected, one such sample was forwarded to the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur for determining its Indian Sugar Standard Grade and in this, the Grade marked by the factory as 'M-30' was found, on analysis, to be of Grade 'S-30'. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the factory requiring them to furnish their explanation. The explanation filed by the factory was not found satisfactory. Consequently, the Director (Sugar Technical), Government of India, Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, New Delhi in its D.O. letter No. INSP.PRC.F.2334/GC/85/1806/dt.3.10.1986, observed that accused 1 company had violated the provisions of the control order issued under the essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act') relating to the packing and marking of sugar bags and requested the Government of Tamil Nadu to launch prosecution against the said company.

4. The Government of Tamil Nadu in turn by letter No. 54478/MIDIp86-l, Industries Department, dated 13-11-1986 requested the Director of Sugare, Madras-35 launch prosecution against accused 1- company and he in turn in his letter Rc.No.32217/86, dated 19.11.1986 addressed the Collector of South Arcot, Cuddalore and as per the directions of the Collector, the Civil Supplies C.I.D., Cuddalore--the respondent herein registered the case in Crime No. 69/86 for violation of Clause 4(1) of the Sugar (Packing and Marking) Order, 1970 (for short 1970 order') and took up further investigation.

5. After completing the formalities of the investigation, a final report under Section 173(2) Crl. P.C. had been laid against accused 1 to 3 for the aforesaid violation, which is now pending in the said Summary Trial case.

6. On receipt of process, the petitioners came forward with the present action invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them.

7. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that violation of Clause 4(1) of 1970 order, an order passed in exercise of the power conferred by Clause-5 of the Sugar (Control) Order 1966 (for short 1966 order') can by no stretch of imagination be stated in the eye of law, to be a contravention of the provisions of 1966 order, which is an order passed under Section 3 of the Act. He would however submit that the violations of the provisions of 1966 order is punishable under Section 7 of the Act and a person can be convicted under Section 7 thereof only when it is proved that he has contravened any order made under Section 3 of the Act. In pith and substance, what he would say is that the contravention of Clause 4(1) of 1970 order cannot at all be stated to be contravention of the provisions of 1966 order liable to be punished under Section 7 of the Act.

8. Learned Public Prosecutor would however repel such submissions.

9. I may now delve deep to find the tenability or otherwise of the submissions of either counsel, in the light of the provisions adumbrated under 1966 Order, 1970 order and the Act.

10. Towards this arduous task and venture I may refer to the Division Bench decision