Order of eviction liable to be set aside.

Somasundaram, J.

1. The legal representatives of the respondent (tenant) in H.R.C.O.P. No. 27 of 1985 on the file of the Rent Controller, Karaikkal, are the petitioners in this civil revision petition. The legal representatives of the petitioner (landlady) in the said H.R.C.O.P. are the respondents in this civil revision petition. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to by the nomenclature given to them in the H.R.C.O.P.

2. The petitioner filed H.R.C.O.P. No.27 of 1985 on the file of the Rent Controller, Karaikkal under Section 1O(2)(a)(i) of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, I960, hereinafter called 'the Act', for eviction on the ground that the petition mentioned premises is required for her own occupation.

3. The respondents resisted the application contending that the petitioner's requirement for her own occupation is not bona fide.

4. The Rent Controller, on a consideration of the entire evidence on record, held that the requirement of the demised building for the personal occupation of the petitioner is bona fide, Consequently allowed the H.R.C.O.P. and ordered eviction.

5. The legal representatives of the respondent, aggrieved by the order of eviction passed in H.R.C.O.P. No. 27 of 1985, filed an appeal, C.M.A. No. 8 of 1987 before the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikkal. The Appellate Authority confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. As against the order of the Appellate Authority the legal representatives of the respondent have filed this civil revision petition.

6. Mr. T.P. Manoharan, learned Counsel for the legal representatives of the respondent would contend that C.M.A. No. 8 of 1967 was disposed of by the Appellate Authority on 5.8.1988 and that subsequently on 29.8.1988 the petitioner-landlady died and, therefore, the ground on which the eviction was sought for and ordered, viz., for the personal occupation of the petitioner, is no longer subsisting and that in view of the subsequent events the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside. The above point was raised in ground No. 15 of the memorandum of grounds of revision, in the following terms:

It is respectfully submitted that the landlady had died on 29.8.1988 namely after the delivery of the judgment in C.M.A. Therefore, the eviction sought for and ordered on the ground of personal occupation is no longer subsisting and available to the L. Rs., of the landlady to execute and evict the petitioners from the demised premises and hence the order of eviction should be set aside to put an end to the lis.

There is substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the legal representatives of the respondent. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu, In re., The Supreme Court has held as follows:

We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can and in many cases must take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.

In Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad : , the Supreme Court has held as follows:

If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must be continues throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final