1980 Supreme(Mad) 431
1981 1 MLJ 485
A. Varadarajan, J.
P. Karunakaran
Versus
V.M. Ponnuswamy Achari
Decided on: 7/11/1980
C.R.P. No. 2865 of 1980
Revision against trail Courts ruling not maintainable.
Headnote:Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Section 25-Revision against ruling given by Trail Court not maintainable-Rectification of mistake make be done at the Appellate stage.
A. Varadarajan, J.
1. This revision petition has been filed against the ruling given by the Rent Controler, Villupuram, on the question whether an un-registered document can be received in evidence. Having regard to the view expressed by me that it is not desirable to admit civil revision petitions against the trial Court's ruling allowing or disallowing a particular piece of evidence, in view of the fact that the error, if any committed by the trial Court in admitting a particular piece of evidence or declining to admit such a piece of evidence, could be rectified in the appellate forum, Mr. R. S. Venkatachari the learned Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to three decisions. Ore of them is Mt. Hubraji v. Deputy Commissioner, Fyrabad A.I.R. 1943 Oudh. 169, where the learned Judge has observed thus:
A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Assistant Government Advocate that this revision petition is not maintainable as the learned District Judge in passing the order in question did not act as a Court or a Civil Court subordinate to this Court. A reference has been made in support of this contention to Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappo Reddy (1907) I.L.R. 30 Mad. 326, 17 M.L.J. 313. Maganna Nayudu v. Pattaohiramayya (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 245 : 27 L.W. 346 : 54 M.L.J. 595 : A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 425, and Deputy Commissioner, Partapgar v. Ram Harekh A.I.R. 1926 Oudh. 397. In the two Madras cases, the order in question was one passed by the District Register acting under the Registration Act. These cases have, therefore, no relevancy to the present case. The Oudh case does not deal with this point at all. All that was held in that case was that when an application under Section 61 is made by the Collector to the Revision Court, no notice to the person liable is required to be issued. Although learned Counsel for the appellant complained that the order was passed by the learned District Judge behind his back and without any notice to him, he has not urged that the order on that account is void.
After making this observation, the learned Judge has held that the decision of the learned District Judge in that case was correct and must be upheld.
2. That is not a case where a revision petition has been admitted against a trial Court's ruling on the question of admissibility or otherwise of any piece of evidence.
3. The next decision to which my attention was drawn by Mr. R. S. Venkatachari is of Shahmiri, J. in Rahim Peray v. Mst. Jenti A.I.R. 1957 J & K. 49, where the learned Judge has held that a revision lies against an interlocutory order of a Munsif determining the nature of the document produced by the plaintiff and admitting it in evidence on payment of duty and penalty under proviso (1) to Section 35. The learned Judge observed thus:
A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Counsel for the non-applicant that the revision was not the proper remedy for the applicant and that under Section 39 of the Stamp Act the plaintiff could approach the Collector and obtain refund of the whole penalty if his objection was well-founded. I am not clear if Section 39 would apply in this case as the document has not, in fact, been impounded by the trial Court.
The next point taken by counsel for the non-applicant is that under Section 61 of the Stamp Act the Court to which appeals lie from or references are made by, trial Court can take such order into consideration and, therefore, the applicant should move the District Court. I however, do not see anything in Section 61 of the Stamp Act which could prevent this Court from exercising its revisional jurisdiction in the matter. I am supported in this conclusion by Mt. Hubraji v. Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad A.I.R. 1943 Oudh. 169, to which my attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel for the applicant.
The relevant provision in Section 61 of the Stamp Act was considered by the Oudh Chief Court and it was held that there was no reason to think that the word 'Court' as used