A person employed in an administrative or managerial capacity is not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

1. The writ petition is for certiorari to quash the award of the Additional Labour Court, Madras rendered in I.D. No. 256 of 1975. The dispute in the award relates to the non-employment of the first respondent, an Engineering Graduate, who was working as a development officer of the petitioner-company due to discharge simpliciter as he was un-co-operative in his work, and irregular in his attendance. As a result of this, he lost the confidence of the management. Without giving an opportunity to the first respondent to defend, these allegations of un-co-operative nature and irregularity in attendance, which are all false, and in the guise of discharge he was punished by way of dismissal without any enquiry as required under law. The writ petitioner-management contended that the first respondent was not a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He belonged to the administrative or managerial cadre, though a technical person. On these pleadings three issues were posed for determination by the Labour Court, which are as follows :

(1) Whether the petitioner is a workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act?

(2) Whether action in discharging the petitioner's service is a colourable exercise of power of the respondent as the motivation behind it was to dismiss the petitioner?

(3) To what relief?

2. On the first issue he came to the conclusion that the first respondent herein was doing only technical work, i.e., he was functioning in his technical capacity alone and so he is workman under S. 2(s) of the Act. On issue No. 2 it was concluded that it was not a bona fide discharge. The management wanted to get rid of the workman from its services for reasons best known to it and got rid of him by discharging him. It is a colourable exercise of the power of the respondent as it is dismissal guised in discharge. As a result, an award was passed directing reinstatement of the first respondent with backwages till 26-8-1977 from which date he is employed elsewhere and which he has agreed to give up continuity of service and other attendant benefits. Thus, the writ petition.

3. Mr. S. Govindaswaminathan, appearing for the management, states that the first respondent was a graduate apprentice. On 1-12-1962 he was appointed as a Senior Foreman (Machine Shop) till 30-11-1971 and on that date he was appointed as a Development Officer, carrying a salary of Rs. 1,050 as basic and Rs. 210 as dearness allowance. By a reading of the award, it will be seen that the Labour Court had completely misdirected itself. The first respondent signed all the correspondence not in his administrative or managerial capacity, but only in his technical capacity. That is clearly against the tenor of the various documents.

4. The definition of the workmen under S. 2(s) of the Act will not take kin a person who functions in his administrative capacity. Because of his technical knowledge, the approach of the Labour Court is just the reverse. The decision reported in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. V. Management Staff Association, [1970-II L.L.J. 590], is clearly in his favour, paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said judgment will completely decide the issue in favour of the petitioner. The Labour Court has approached the question in a reverse way. Merely because the first respondent was working as a chief buyer, he did not cease to be a workman, because he himself was working under the Managing Director. The charge in relation to the employees attached to Ext. W. 5. will show that the first respondent was part of the administrative set up. The correspondence, Exts. M. 12, M. 32, M. 37 were marked to show the administrative capacity in which the first respondent was functioning. Looked at from this point of view the award is wholly un-understandable. To say that because the first respondent was a technical man, he ceases to be in administrative capacity is an error of law which this Court is