Allegation of willful default rejected.

V. Balasubrahmanyan, J.

1. In this revision by the landlord of a building in Kumbakonam town, the only point for consideration is whether the Rent Controller was justified in holding that the default in payment of rent by the tenant was not wilful, since at the material time, he was afflicted by a heart condition and had to take his treatment in Madras.

2. The learned Counsel appearing for the landlord in this revision submitted, in the first place, that there was no evidence apart from that of the tenant himself, that he was suffering from a heart ailment. Learned Counsel further submitted, that although the tenant had stated that he was taking treatment for his heart condition in a nursing home at Madras, that did not prevent him from making a flying visit to Kumbakonam and from paying the, rent. Learned Counsel accordingly submitted that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority ought not to have drawn the inference that the tenant was suffering from a heart disease and that condition really prevented him from paying the rent.

3. I do not think that in this revision I can go into the question, whether on the evidence on record, the Rent Controller or the appellate authority was justified in finding that the petitioner was suffering from a heart ailment, that Tie was in Madras for a considerable period of time undergoing treatment in a nursing home and that owing to that disability he was prevented from making payment of the rent to the landlord on the due dates. I cannot go into these findings, because as a revisional Court I have no jurisdiction to review the findings of fact of the Rent Controller, although the revisional power under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 would appear, on the surface, to confer a wider power than that which prevails under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mix. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeina Works and Ors. v. Rangasami Chettiar the Supreme Court had occasion is one which had been common to both on the High Court, under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence, and despite the wide language employed in that section, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the subordinate authority on those findings. In the present case the finding with which I am faced in this revision is one which had been common to both I the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. Concurrent findings of this kind are untouchable by the High Court in revision. I must therefore, accept the findings of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority that the tenant was suffering from a heart ailment and he had to go to Madras in 1977 for undergoing treatment and he was in Madras till December, 1977, when he returned to Kumbakonam. I must accept the further findings of the appellate authority and the Rent Controller that it was this physical disability of the tenant for a long period, which was responsible for his not attending to his responsibilities as a tenant.

4. The further question which was argued by learned Counsel for the landlord was that even on the footing that the tenant was suffering from a heart disease, the question is whether that could be a lawful excuse for not paying the rent on the due dates. To put the idea differently, can it be said that the default in payment of rent was not wilful default merely because the tenant was at the material time ill with a heart disease? In the present case the default was in respect of rents from August to November, 1977. On the evidence accepted by the authorities below, that he was bedridden from August to November, 1977 and that he was away in Madras, the question is whether that could be regarded as a lawful excuse, which will relieve the tenant from the consequences of the default committed by him. Learned Counsel for the tenant in the course of his argument submitted that the ailment of this kind ca